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Chris Wold* 
The United States now has a climate change policy focused 
on reducing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). Most of this policy has been generated by the Obama 
Administration through executive action, primarily within the 
Environmental Protection Agency. To meet U.S. pledges to 
reduce GHG emissions by 17% by 2020 and 83% by 2050, 
President Obama must do more because it is clear that 
Congress will not address climate change. As described in this 
Article, there is much more the president can do. Using his 
treaty-making authority, he can take a more positive, 
constructive approach to reducing GHG emissions in the 
climate change negotiations. He also has a number of tools 
available within the World Trade Organization for encouraging 
fuel efficiency, disseminating technologies that would mitigate 
GHG emissions, and eliminating fossil fuel subsidies. 
Domestically, he can direct agencies to impose higher 
standards on existing sources of GHG emissions rather 
focusing solely on new and modified sources. He can also do 
much more to reduce emissions of powerful but short-lived 
climate forcers, such as methane and black carbon. For 
example, 99% of black carbon emissions could be eliminated 
from existing trucks by requiring the use of regenerative filters. 
Lastly, the president could redirect funding to climate prizes 
that reward innovation in developing transformative 
technologies to reduce GHG emissions. In this political climate, 
and with climate science pointing to ever greater climate 
impacts, President Obama must use the presidency to act. We 
can’t wait. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2007, then-Senator Barack Obama wrote, “As the world’s 
largest producer of greenhouse gases, America has the responsibility 
to lead.”1 As President, he has led. At the domestic level, working 
primarily through the Environmental Protection Agency, President 
Obama has increased fuel economy standards,2 imposed new limits on 
1. Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, FOREIGN AFF., July–
Aug. 2007, at 13. 
2. Most recently, the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated 
regulations to increase fuel efficiency of model year 2017 to 2025 light 
duty vehicles to 54.5 miles per gallon. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-
Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,627 (Oct. 15, 2012). 
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greenhouse gas emissions from “major emitting facilities,”3 and 
imposed limits on emissions relating to the development of oil and 
gas,4 among many other things.5 As he has said, he must use his 
executive power because “We Can’t Wait” for Congress to act on 
climate change.6 
Nonetheless, he must do more. President Obama has pledged to 
the international community that the United States will reduce its 
greenhouse gases by 17% of 2005 levels by 2020 and by 83% by 2050.7 
3. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,6547 (June 3, 2010). 
4. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 
Fed. Reg. 49490 (Aug. 16, 2012). 
5. See infra Section III. 
6. President Obama has adopted a “We Can’t Wait” initiative as a means 
to bypass the inaction of Congress on a range of issues, including 
climate change. See We Can’t Wait, THE WHITE HOUSE, http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/economy/jobs/we-cant-wait (last visited Dec. 20, 
2012) (“President Obama is not letting congressional gridlock slow our 
economic growth.”). See also Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power 
Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A1 (describing 
the ways in which President Obama has implemented his “We Can’t 
Wait” initiative).   
7. In the Copenhagen Accord, the United States first pledged to reduce its 
GHG emissions “[i]n the range of 17 per cent . . . in conformity with 
anticipated United States energy and climate legislation, recognizing 
that the final target will be reported to the secretariat in light of 
enacted legislation.” Copenhagen Accord, Decision 2/CP.15, Appendix I, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010). In a footnote in 
an appendix, the pledge continued: “The pathway set forth in pending 
legislation would entail a 30% reduction in 2025 and a 42% reduction in 
2030, in line with the goal to reduce emissions 83% by 2050. Id. ¶ 26. 
The United States affirmed its pledge the following year in the Cancun 
Agreements. See UN Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), The 
Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention 
Decision, Decision 1/CP.16, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 
15, 2011). The actual pledge is found in Compilation of Economy-wide 
Emission Reduction Targets to Be Implemented by Parties Included in 
Annex I to the Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1 
(June 7, 2011) [hereinafter Compilation of Economy-wide Emission 
Reduction Targets]: 
The United States communicated a target in the range of a 17 
per cent emission reduction by 2020 compared with 2005 levels, 
in conformity with anticipated United States energy and climate 
legislation, recognizing that the final target will be reported to 
the secretariat in the light of the enacted legislation. In addition, 
the pathway set forth in pending legislation would entail a 30 
per cent emission reduction by 2025 and a 42 per cent emission 
reduction by 2030, in line with the goal to reduce emissions by 
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The President has also set a goal of ensuring that “[b]y 2035 we will 
generate 80 percent of our electricity from a diverse set of clean 
energy sources—including renewable energy sources like wind, solar, 
biomass, and hydropower; nuclear power; efficient natural gas; and 
clean coal.”8 None of his actions come close to meeting these goals.  
Moreover, he must do more to help the international community 
reach its goal of keeping average global temperatures from increasing 
2°C above pre-industrial levels.9 Many scientists argue that the 2°C 
goal can be met, and the worst impacts of climate change avoided, if 
we keep carbon dioxide concentrations below 350 parts per million 
(ppm).10 As of July 2012, atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide exceeded 394 ppm.11 The United States is by far the largest 
historic contributor to these high levels of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, having contributed 28.52% of carbon dioxide from energy.12 
As such, the United States must do much more to ensure that the 
world’s largest historic emitter of greenhouse gases fulfills its moral 
and perhaps legal obligation to reduce greenhouse gases before we 
reach climate change tipping points beyond which climate change will 
be irreversible for millennia to come.  
83 per cent by 2050. The submission of the target by the United 
States was made on the assumption that other Annex I Parties, 
as well as more advanced non-Annex I Parties, would, by 31 
January 2010, associate with the Copenhagen Accord and 
submit mitigation actions for compilation into an information 
document in accordance with paragraph 4 or 5 of the Accord, as 
the case may be. 
 
       Id. ¶ 26. 
8. THE WHITE HOUSE, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 6–7 
(Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE], 
available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_s 
ecure_energy_future.pdf.  
9. UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, § II(A), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 
2012). 
10. See Is It Too Late to Avoid the Worst Impacts of Climate Change?, SCI. 
AM. (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id= 
reducing-atmospheric-co2 (“Prior to 2007 scientists weren’t sure what 
emissions reduction goal to shoot for, but new evidence led researchers 
to reach consensus on 350 ppm if we wished to have a planet, in the 
words of NASA climatologist James Hansen, ‘similar to the one on 
which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted.’”).  
11. See Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, EARTH SYS. RES. LAB., 
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012 
).   
12. See Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), WORLD RESOURCES INST., 
http://www.wri.org/project/cait/ (last updated May 2012).  
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And indeed, President Obama can do much more. As described 
below, the president can use his foreign affairs power to take a more 
positive role on the international stage, whether that stage is the 
climate change negotiations, the negotiations concerning other 
international treaties, or within the World Trade Organization. He 
can also do more with his executive power, not only by increasing 
existing standards but also by applying them to existing sources of 
greenhouse gases, not just new sources. Further, President Obama has 
so far failed to take advantage of strategies to mitigate emissions of 
short-term climate forcers such as black carbon that could provide 
significant climate benefits. Lastly, the approaches adopted so far 
have not pushed regulated entities or others to develop the 
transformative technologies that will be needed to deliver sufficient 
climate change benefits to avert the environmental and economic 
crisis that lies ahead if we fail to take more aggressive action.  
Section II of this article summarizes the climate change challenges 
facing humanity. Section III reviews the major climate-related actions 
supported and adopted by President Obama. Section IV describes 
how these actions fall short of what is needed and the additional steps 
that the President can take. Section V concludes that, while 
congressional action is preferable to presidential action, the President 
has many more climate change mitigation opportunities available to 
him. His failure to pursue them will have grave consequences for the 
United States and the world.  
II. The Challenge Ahead  
Scientists estimate that the atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) prior to the industrial revolution was 280 ppm.13 In its 
last report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
reported that the atmospheric concentration of CO2 had reached 379 
ppm in 2005.14 As of July 2012, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 
had topped 394 ppm.15 When all six greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered 
by the Kyoto Protocol are added to the mix, concentrations have 
exceeded 439 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2eq) since 2009.16  
13. See Causes of Climate Change, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechan 
ge/science/causes.html (last updated June 28, 2012). 
14. Richard B. Alley et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 2 (Susan Soloman et al. eds., 2007).  
15. See Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, supra note 11.  
16. See Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Concentrations (CSI 013), EURO. 
ENVTL. AGENCY (Jan. 25, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.eea.europa.eu/ 
data-and-maps/indicators/atmospheric-greenhouse-gas-concentrations-
2/ds_resolveuid/c24c43db-cf40-4db1-a211-1dd38e949669.jWhen 
including other long-lived GHGs, except water vapor, ozone and 
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Many scientists argue that CO2 concentrations above 350 ppm 
and CO2eq concentrations above 450 ppm must be avoided to achieve 
the current goal of the climate change regime to keep temperatures 
from increasing 2°C above pre-industrial levels.17 According to the UN 
Environment Programme, “[e]mission pathways consistent with a 
‘likely’ [greater than 66%] chance of meeting the 2°C target” must 
peak before 2020 at emission levels around 44 GtCO2eq, with global 
emissions declining steeply thereafter—on average 2.6% per year.18 As 
part of the climate change regime, eighty six countries have pledged 
to reduce emissions, but these pledges, at best, are 8 GtCO2eq short 
of meeting that goal.19 In fact, the gap between pledges and the 2°C 
goal are certain to be much higher because many of the pledges are 
conditional,20 and the United States is not close to meeting its pledge, 
weak as it is, of reducing 2005 emissions by 17% by 2020.  
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), any chance 
of meeting the 2°C goal must begin now and include a significant 
technological component. In the IEA’s “450 Scenario,” strong policy 
actions must be taken now to peak global energy-related CO2 
emissions before 2020, with those emissions declining to 21.6 Gt by 
2035. However, the 450 Scenario requires investment in and consumer 
spending on energy-related equipment totaling $15.2 trillion relative 
to an emissions pathway that takes us to a long-term rise in the 
average global temperature in excess of 3.5°C.21 The IEA emphasizes 
that action must happen now due to the long economic life spans of 
energy-related infrastructure—power stations, buildings and factories. 
Already, 80% of global CO2 emissions emitted between 2009 and 2035 
in the 450 Scenario are “locked-in” by existing infrastructure or 
infrastructure that is under construction and will still be operational 
by 2035.22 If the global community waits until 2017 to take 
coordinated action, the IEA estimates that “all permissible emissions 
in the 450 Scenario would come from the infrastructure then existing, 
aerosols, the total atmospheric concentration of the long-lived GHGs 
was 461 CO2eq in 2009, an increase from 278 in pre-industrial times. Id.  
17. See, e.g., UN ENVIR. PROG., BRIDGING THE EMISSIONS GAP: A UNEP 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 17 (2011). 
18. Id. at 9. 
19. UN ENVIR. PROG., THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012: A UNEP 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 1 (2012). 
20. See Compilation of Economy-wide Emission Reduction Targets, supra 
note 7, ¶ 26.  
21. Even under these circumstances, IEA estimates this scenario has only a 
50% probability of limiting temperature increase to 2°C by keeping total 
GHG concentrations to 450 ppm CO2eq. IEA, World Energy Outlook 
2011 Factsheet 2 (2011). 
22. Id. 
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so that all new infrastructure from then until 2035 would need to be 
zero-carbon, unless emitting infrastructure is retired before the end of 
its economic lifetime to make headroom for new investment.”23 If 
action is delayed until 2015, approximately 45% of the global fossil 
fuel capacity installed by then would have to be retired early or 
refurbished by 2035.24 Moreover, delayed action will be expensive: “for 
every $1 of investment in the power sector avoided before 2020, an 
additional $4.3 would need to be spent after 2020 to compensate for 
the higher emissions.”25  
The stark implications of a business-as-usual emissions future 
have led many political leaders to call for dramatic cuts in GHG 
emissions and a need for a collective effort to retool the energy base of 
our modern economies to achieve a low-carbon or carbon-free 
economy. Not only will developed countries have to reduce their 
emissions drastically, but developing and even least-developed 
countries will need to increase energy access in a climate-friendly way. 
Meeting this challenge will require a “transformative technological 
revolution.”26 
The IEA report reinforces the view that this technological change 
must be transformative and revolutionary rather than incremental. If 
not, then we risk locking in technologies for decades, different from 
the ones we need in a carbon-free future. For example, even “[b]illion-
dollar investments in hybrid auto engines . . . would still leave future 
motor vehicles dependent on harmful fossil fuel combustion and would 
retain little market value when polluting nations must eventually 
convert their automotive transportation systems to GHG-free 
methods.”27 Similarly, a new state-of-the-art coal-fired power plant in 
India may reduce GHG emissions by 10% compared to traditional 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. According to the International Climate Change Task Force: 
Climate change, energy security, and the urgent need to increase 
access to modern energy services for the world’s poor create an 
enormous need for more efficient low-carbon and no-carbon 
energy-supply options. We need a transformative technological 
revolution in the twenty-first century involving the development 
and rapid deployment of cleaner energy and transportation 
technologies. By reducing greenhouse emissions and deploying 
new climate-friendly technologies, companies can create jobs and 
launch a new era of economic prosperity. 
 
 INT’L CLIMATE CHANGE TASK FORCE, MEETING THE CLIMATE 
CHALLENGE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE TASK FORCE 1 (2005).  
27. HOWARD A. LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES 157 (2012). 
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power plants, but the new plant will still emit more than 20 million 
tons of GHGs per year for decades.28 
So the question is not whether the president is doing something. 
The question is whether the president is doing the right thing. Are 
the policies being put in place the ones that will encourage the 
development of technologies that can help us reach a carbon-free 
future?  
III. Presidential Efforts to Mitigate Climate Change 
The president has a variety of tools available to take action. 
These include regulations, litigation, prosecutorial discretion, waivers, 
signing statements, executive orders, and treaty-making authority, 
among others.29 To combat climate change, the President has used all 
of these tools, although clearly he has relied primarily on the 
establishment of new regulations to reduce CO2. 
After years of litigation over the EPA’s authority to regulate CO2 
and three other GHGs (methane, nitrous oxide, and 
hydrofluorocarbons) as pollutants in motor vehicle emissions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA ruled that GHGs are “air 
pollutants” that “unambiguous[ly]” may be regulated under the Clean 
Air Act.30 The Court did not direct the EPA to conclude that CO2 
from new motor vehicles may “cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare”31—a precondition for regulating motor vehicle pollutants.32 
However, any other finding was implausible given the near-universal 
scientific consensus, including multiple reports from the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences,33 that “[m]ost of the observed increase in 
28. Id. at 158. 
29. See ALAINE GINOCCHI & KEVIN DORAN, CTR. FOR ENERGY & EXEC. 
AUTH., THE BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY: USING EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS TO IMPLEMENT FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 5–13 (2008). 
30. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529, 533 (2007) (“Under the clear 
terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if 
it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change 
or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will 
not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.”). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
32. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is required to regulate motor vehicle 
emissions of any “air pollutant” that in the “judgment” of the 
Administrator “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 
U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006) 
33. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., CLIMATE 
STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS 
OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA (2010). 
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globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very 
likely [i.e., 90–95% likely] due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”34 Inevitably, the EPA 
made its “endangerment finding”35 and began regulating GHGs from 
motor vehicles.36 The finding, upheld by the DC Circuit,37 also opened 
the door for regulation under other parts of the Clean Air Act.38 
With this newly clarified regulatory authority, President Obama, 
through the EPA and other agencies, has begun to regulate CO2 and 
other GHGs from a variety of sources.39 The most significant actions 
include the following: 
34. Richard B. Alley et al., supra note 14, at 10. The most recent 
assessment of climate change science can be found in a report of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. AM. 
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2011(Jessica 
Blunden & Derek S. Arndt eds., 2012).  
35. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 
(Dec. 15, 2009). 
36. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 
7, 2010). 
37. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 117 
(D.C. Cir. 2012).  
38. Other provisions of the Clean Air Act contain endangerment language 
identical or almost identical to the language relating to motor vehicles 
under § 7521(a)(1). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4) (allowing the EPA 
to regulate emissions from new non-road engines and vehicles if those 
emissions “contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7411(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring the EPA to set emission performance 
standards for any stationary source that “causes, or contributes 
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare”). 
39. Other articles treat the specific regulatory acts in more detail than this 
article. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The 
Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama 
Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 (2011); Jody Freeman, 
The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the 
Car Deal, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2011) (examining vehicle 
emission regulation and the expansion of regulatory authority under the 
Clean Air Act, and describing lessons for future regulatory action); Hari 
M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for 
the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011) (assessing the 
Obama Administration’s approach to climate change and energy law 
and suggesting how future strategies must be developed to combat 
climate change); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 
2010, at 40 (2010) (providing a list and description of each policy 
involving climate change mitigation or adaptation in the United States 
created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
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1. On June 30, 2009, the Obama Administration’s EPA granted  
    California a waiver of preemption under the Clean Air Act to    
    enforce its GHG standards for model year 2009 vehicles and  
    later models of new motor vehicles.40 The decision, taken  
    after President Obama specifically instructed the EPA to   
    reconsider its prior decision,41 reversed the EPA’s decision  
    under the Bush Administration.42 The waiver authorizes  
    California and other states wishing to follow California’s  
    standards to adopt more stringent GHG controls for motor  
    vehicles than applicable federal standards.43 
 
2. On April 1, 2010, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic  
    Safety Administration (NHTSA) promulgated regulations  
    increasing fuel economy standards and requiring reductions  
    in GHG emissions from cars and light-duty trucks covering  
    model years 2012 through 2016 (the Tailpipe Rule).44 These  
    rules effectively require automakers to produce vehicles with  
    an average fuel efficiency of 34.1 miles per gallon by 2016,45   
40. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of 
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). 
41. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to Administrator of 
the EPA, Lisa Jackson (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/Presidential-Memorandum-EPA-Waiver/.  
42. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of 
Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 
2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 
for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006). That provision requires EPA to grant a 
waiver unless it finds that California: 
• was arbitrary and capricious in its finding that its standards 
are in the aggregate at least as protective of public health and 
welfare as applicable federal standards; 
• does not need such standards to meet compelling and 
extraordinary conditions; or  
• has proposed standards not consistent with Section 202(a) of 
the Clean Air Act.  
 
 For more on California’s waiver request, see California Greenhouse Gas 
Waiver Request, EPA, http://epa.gov/oms/climate/ca-waiver.htm (last 
updated July 31, 2012). 
44. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). 
This rule was applied in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. 
EPA, 684 F.3d. 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
45. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 25,330. 
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    which the EPA and the NHTSA estimate will reduce GHG  
    emissions from these vehicles by approximately 21% by  
    2030.46 
 
3. On August 28, 2012, the EPA and NHTSA jointly proposed  
    rules setting GHG emission standards and fuel economy  
    standards for 2017 to 2025 model year light-duty vehicles.47  
    The standards will increase emissions and fuel economy  
    standards for passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium- 
    duty passenger vehicles from 2017 to 2025, achieving an  
    industry fleet-wide average of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025,  
    reduce fuel consumption by 4 billion barrels of oil, and  
    decrease GHG emissions by 2 billion metric tons.48  
 
4. On September 15, 2011, the EPA and the NHTSA published    
    regulations to increase fuel economy and reduce GHG  
    emissions (CO2, CH4, and N2O) from medium- and heavy- 
    duty vehicles, including larger trucks, vans, buses, and  
    tractors.49 The agencies estimate that the new standards will  
    reduce CO2 emissions from these vehicles by “approximately  
    270 million metric tons and save 530 million barrels of oil  
    over the life of vehicles sold during the 2014 through 2018  
    model years, providing over $7 billion in net societal benefits,  
    and $49 billion in net societal benefits when private fuel  
    savings are considered.”50 
 
5. As a consequence of the Tailpipe Rule, the EPA must  
    regulate stationary sources under the Prevention of  
    Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) program.51  
46. Id. at 25,328.  
47. See Regulations and Standards: Light-Duty, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
oms/climate/regs-light-duty.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2012); 2017 and 
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854 (Dec. 
1, 2011) [hereinafter 2017–2025 Final Rule]. 
48. 2017–2025 Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,859. Due to a variety of 
factors, NHTSA’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards will 
increase to an industry fleet-wide average of 48.7–49.7 mpg by 2025. Id. 
at 11. 
49. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles; Final Rules, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
50. Id. 
51. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation 
Plans  45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 (Aug. 7, 1980); Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,553–54 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. 
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    The PSD program requires state-issued construction permits  
    for certain types of stationary sources (iron, steel, and mill  
    plants, for example) that emit more than 100 tons per year  
    of any “air pollutant.”52 All other stationary sources emitting  
    more than 250 tons per year of any air pollutant are also  
    covered.53 As a consequence, the EPA now requires these  
    “major emitting facilities” covered by the PSD program to  
    install best-available control technology for GHGs.54  
    However, because immediate regulation of greenhouse gas- 
    emitting sources exceeding the 100 and 250 tons per year  
    benchmarks would result in “overwhelming permitting  
    burdens that would . . . fall on permitting authorities and  
    sources,”55 the EPA has limited the meaning of “major  
    emitting facility” to those facilities emitting more than  
    75,000 and 100,000 tons per year CO2 equivalent,56 depending  
    on the program and project.57 
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(1) (2006). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
54. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine 
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 
17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
55. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
56. CO2 equivalent, usually abbreviated as CO2eq or CO2e, is defined by the 
IPCC as: 
The amount of CO2 emission that would cause the same 
integrated radiative forcing as an emitted amount of a 
greenhouse gas or of a mixture of well mixed greenhouse gases, 
all multiplied by their respective global warming potentials, 
which take into account the differing times they remain in the 
atmosphere.  
 Annex I: Glossary, Acronyms, Chemical Symbols and Prefixes (Aviel 
Verbruggen et al. eds.), in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 956 (O. Edenhofer 
et al. eds., 2011), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/sr 
ren/SRREN_Annex_Glossary.pdf. 
57. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,523–524. “Modification” projects 
must exceed 75,000 tons per year CO2 eq and “construction” projects 
must exceed 100,000 tons per year CO2 eq. Significantly, the Clean Air 
Act only requires PSD permits for stationary sources that meet the 
definition of ““major emitting facility” and are located in an area 
designated as “attainment” or “unclassifiable” for any pollutant subject 
to a national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS). 42 U.S.C. § 
7407(d)(1)(A). EPA has set NAAQS for only six substances: carbon 
monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particle pollution, and sulfur 
dioxide. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA http://ww 
w.epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2012).  
 The PSD Rule for GHGs is, in fact, more complicated than indicated. 
The rule established thresholds that may be modified in the future. For 
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6. On March 27, 2012, the EPA proposed a “standard of  
    performance,”58 more commonly referred to as “new source  
    performance standards” (NSPS), for new59 fossil fuel fired  
    power plants that are greater than 25 megawatts of  
    electricity. These plants must meet an output-based  
    standard of 1,000 pounds of CO2 per megawatt hour.60 This  
    rule will push power plants to use natural gas or renewables.  
    While it does not prohibit the use of coal, a coal-fired power  
    plant would need to use carbon capture and sequestration  
    technologies to capture at least 50% of its CO2 to keep CO2  
     emissions below the new threshold.61 These plants represent  
    the greatest source of GHGs in the United States—40% of all  
    U.S. CO2 emissions and 34% in 2010.62 If the facilities use  
the first six months of 2011, GHG-permitting requirements applied only 
to those stationary sources already subject to the PSD program, and 
best available control technology was required for those already-
regulated facilities that increase their GHG emissions by 75,000 tons per 
year or more. From July 2011 through June 2013, the PSD permitting 
requirements apply to new construction projects that emit 100,000 tons 
or more of GHGs per year and to modifications that increase GHG 
emissions by 75,000 tons or more per year. The EPA may also decide at 
a later date to initiate another rulemaking in order to apply the PSD 
permitting requirements to facilities emitting 50,000 tons or more of 
GHGs per year. See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
58. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 
22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed NSPS Rule]. The Clean Air 
Act defines a “standard of performance” as:  
[A] standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the 
degree of emission limitation achievable through the application 
of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into 
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair 
quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.  
 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
59. The Clean Air Act defines a “new source” as “any stationary source, the 
construction or modification of which is commenced after publication of 
regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a standard of 
performance under [CAA section 111] which will be applicable to such 
source.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2). 
60. Proposed NSPS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,394. The NSPS does not apply 
to fossil fuel fired power plants that have been issued a PSD permit by 
the date of the proposed rule and that commence construction within 
twelve months of the date of publication of this proposal. Id. at 22,395. 
61. See EPA, Fact Sheet: Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for New 
Power Plants 1–3, available at http://www.epa.gov/carbonpollutionstan 
dard/pdfs/20120327factsheet.pdf (Mar. 27, 2012).  
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    natural gas rather than coal, the proposed rule could reduce  
    direct emissions from this sector by roughly 50% because  
    natural gas emits about half as much CO2 as coal.63 
 
7. The United States has contributed $5 million towards the  
    reduction of black carbon in the Russian Arctic.64 
 
8. The United States has committed $12 million of new funding  
    to the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to reduce short-lived  
    climate forcers, such as methane and black carbon (soot), as  
    well as hydrofluorocarbons.65 The United States has also  
    committed $10 million annually to support the Global  
    Methane Initiative and the Global Alliance for Clean  
    Cookstoves.66 
 
9. In December 2009, the EPA began requiring any facility  
    emitting GHGs in excess of 25,000 tons per year, as well as  
    firms in certain specified industries, to report their GHG  
    emissions.67 The EPA estimates that the rule covers  
62. Proposed NSPS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,395; Sources of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/ 
sources.html (last updated June 14, 2012). 
63. Proposed NSPS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,398. Methane emissions from 
production of natural gas, however, may significantly reduce the positive 
climate impacts of switching from coal to natural gas. J. DAVID HUGHES, 
Post-Carbon Institute, LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
FROM SHALE GAS COMPARED TO COAL: AN ANALYSIS OF TWO 
CONFLICTING STUDIES 18 (July 2011) (concluding that “[w]hen compared 
on the basis of the average efficiency of the U.S. gas- and coal-fired 
electricity generation fleets, and on the basis of most-efficient-technology 
gas and coal, shale gas clearly has higher emissions over a 20-year 
timeframe and lower emissions over a 100-year timeframe.”). 
64. See Maria Otero, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Aff., How 
the UN Can Contribute to International Cooperation on Climate 
Change, Remarks at the New York-Alesund Symposium in Svalbard, 
Norway (June 23, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/j/143563.ht 
m. 
65. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition To Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants Initiative in 
Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s 
ecretary/rm/2012/02/184061.htm. Foundation partners, however, have 
committed more than $15 million to get the coalition started. Id.  
66. Id. 
67. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,265 
(Oct. 30, 2009). While implemented under President Obama, President 
Bush is responsible for signing the law that authorized the reporting 
requirement—the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, 
Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2007). 
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    approximately 10,000 facilities responsible for 85 to 90% of  
    total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.68 
 
10. In November 2010, the EPA “reaffirmed” that states must  
     list marine waters not meeting water quality standards due  
     to ocean acidification and provided guidance to states on  
     monitoring ocean acidification.69 The EPA had earlier  
     declined to revise its water quality criterion for marine pH.70  
     These actions were the Obama Administration’s response to  
     petitions from the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD)  
     requesting the EPA to establish Total Maximum Daily     
     Loads (TMDLs) for CO2 71 and a lawsuit challenging the   
     EPA’s approval of Washington State’s list of water bodies  
     identified as water quality limited under Section 303(d) of  
     the Clean Water Act.72 As discussed in the CBD’s petitions,  
     the oceans are rapidly acidifying as marine waters absorb  
     atmospheric CO2, which is having a profound impact on  
     marine life. 
 
11. In October 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order  
     13,514, requiring all federal agencies to set goals for reducing    
     GHG emissions directly or indirectly emitted by federal  
68. Hearing on EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Before the Subcomm. 
on Energy & Power and Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Regina McCarthy, Asst. 
Administrator for Air and Radiation, Environmental Protection 
Agency). 
69. Memorandum from Denise Keehner, Director, Off. of Wetlands, Oceans 
and Watersheds, EPA, to the Water Division Directors, Regions 1–10, 
at 6–9 (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/l 
awsguidance/cwa/tmdl/upload/oa_memo_nov2010.pdf. 
70. See Letter from Peter S. Silva, Asst. EPA Adm’r, to Ms. Miyoko 
Sakashita, Ctr. for Biological Diversity (Apr. 15, 2010), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/upload/Memora
ndum-Detailing-EPA-Decision-on-Re-evaluation-and-or-Revision-of-the-
Water-Quality-Criterion-for-Marine-pH-for-the-Protection-of-Aquatic-
Life.pdf. The EPA had earlier declined to revise its water quality 
criterion for marine pH, which is currently set at “PH range of 6. 5 to 
8.5 for marine aquatic life (but not varying more than 0.2 units outside 
of the normally occurring range). This criterion applies to open-ocean 
waters within 3 miles of a State or Territory’s shoreline where the depth 
is substantially greater than the eupholic zone.” Id. 
71. See, e.g., Letter from Miyoko Sakashita, Ocean Prog. Att’y, Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity, to Bruce Gwynne, North Coast Water Quality 
Control Board (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.biologicaldiver 
sity.org/campaigns/ocean_acidification/pdfs/acidification-cwa-
petition.pdf. 
72. See Ctr. Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 2:09-cv-00670-JCC, ¶¶ 2, 26, 
29 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2009). 
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     activities or from activities related to agency activities, such  
     as vendor supply chains and delivery services.73 
 
12. In February 2009, President Obama directed the  
     Department of Energy to meet its statutory obligations  
     under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and  
     the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to set energy efficiency  
     standards for appliances.74 Since that time, the Department  
     of Energy has proposed or adopted a number of new or  
     higher energy efficiency standards for an array of products.75 
 
13. In February 2010, the Council on Environmental Quality  
     issued three guidance documents that describe how federal  
     agencies can evaluate and consider the potential climate  
     change impacts of and resulting GHG emissions from federal  
     actions subject to the National Environmental Policy Act  
     (NEPA).76 The three guidance documents explain when and  
     how an agency should analyze GHG emissions and climate  
     change impacts;77 promote implementation and monitoring   
     of mitigation commitments, including when mitigation  
     supports Findings of No Significant Impact;78 and clarify  
     how agencies adopt and use categorical exclusions.79  
 
73. See Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, § 2(a) (Oct. 8, 2009). 
74. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec’y of Energy, 
Appliance Efficiency Standards (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ApplianceEfficiencyStandards/. 
75. See Notices and Rules, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www1.eere.energy 
.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/current_rulemakings-notices.html 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (including a list of notices and rules adapted 
from February 2009 through October 2012). 
76. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006). NEPA requires the preparation of 
an environmental impact statement for major federal actions that may 
affect the quality of the human environment.” Id. at § 4332(C). 
77. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Draft Guidance, 
Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 75 Fed. Reg. 8,046 (Feb. 23, 2010). 
78. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Draft Guidance, NEPA 
Mitigation and Monitoring; Notice of Availability, 75 Fed. Reg. 8,046 
(Feb. 23, 2010). 
79. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Draft Guidance, 
Establishing, Applying, and Revising Categorical Exclusions under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 8,045 (Feb. 23, 2010). 
For an analysis of these guidance documents, see Fred R. Wagner et al., 
CEQ NEPA Guidance Documents Available for Public Comment 
(Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., Client Alert, Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.bdlaw.com/news-812.html. 
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14. On September 14, 2009, the Department of Interior (DoI)  
     coordinated a Department-wide strategy “to increase  
     scientific understanding of and development of effective  
     adaptive management tools.”80 The strategy directs each  
     bureau within the DoI to consider and analyze climate  
     change impacts of its activities, policies, and plans. The  
     strategy also establishes a “Climate Change Response  
     Council” to coordinate climate change related activities  
     within the department as well as with other agencies.81  
15. After the Fish and Wildlife Service classified the polar bear  
     as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act,82  
     it designated more than 187,000 square miles of sea-ice,  
     terrestrial denning habitat and barrier island habitat as  
    “critical habitat” for polar bears.83 The decision, which the  
     Fish & Wildlife Service declined to make under the Bush   
     Administration,84 now requires federal agencies to consult  
     with the Service to ensure that any action authorized,  
     funded, or carried out by a federal agency does not cause  
     destruction or adverse modification to this habitat.85 
16. On February 8, 2010, the Securities and Exchange  
     Commission (SEC) published interpretive guidance to public  
     companies regarding the Commission’s existing disclosure  
     requirements as they apply to climate change matters.86 The  
     SEC concluded that climate change may trigger disclosure  
     requirements for public companies under certain  
     circumstances. For example, various SEC regulations may  
80. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3285, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR § 3 (Mar. 11, 
2009). 
81. Id. § 5. 
82. Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008). 
83. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical 
Habitat for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) in the United States; 
Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,086 (Dec. 7, 2010). 
84. Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,298. 
85. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531–1599, § 1536(a)(2). A 
federal district court, however, recently vacated the rule designating 
critical habitat because the Fish and Wildlife Service failed to follow the 
procedural requirements of the Endangered Species Act. Alaska Oil & 
Gas Ass’n v. Salazar, No. 3:11-cv-0036-RRB (D. Alaska, Jan. 10, 2013) 
(order granting plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment). 
86. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 
75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
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     impose on public companies a duty to disclose risks  
     associated with climate change legislation and regulations,  
     international agreements, the indirect consequences of such  
     regulation (such as increased demand for goods that result  
     in lower emissions than competing products), and the  
     potential impacts of climate change (such as extreme  
     weather events) on their operations.87 
17. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009  
     (ARRA) included $50 billion for cleaner U.S. energy, greater  
     energy efficiency, and domestic sources of renewable  
     energy.88 Better known as the Stimulus Package, ARRA  
     included $5 billion for the Weatherization Assistance  
     Program, $3.2 billion for Energy Efficiency and  
     Conservation Block Grants, $300 million for the Energy   
     Efficient Appliance Rebate Program and the Energy Star  
     Program, and clean energy tax credits for homeowners.89 
18. In January 2012, the EPA published new rules to implement  
     the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program,90 which  
     establishes minimum volumes of renewable fuels in  
     transportation fuels sold in the United States.91 The EPA  
     estimates that by 2022, the standards will reduce GHG  
     emissions “by 138 million metric tons, about the annual  
     emissions of 27 million passenger vehicles, replacing about  
     seven percent of expected annual diesel consumption and  
     decreasing oil imports by $41.5 billion.”92 
19. In August 2012, the EPA promulgated new rules for  
     emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from gas  
     wells and other aspects of oil and gas development,  
87. See id. at 6,291–97. 
88. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–5, 123 
Stat. 115, 138–40.  
89. This summary of climate change benefits derives from Natural 
Resources Defense Council, An Assessment of the Obama 
Administration’s First-Year Environmental Record 1 (Jan. 2010) 
available at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/obamarecord/files/obamar 
ecord.pdf. 
90. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 
121 Stat. 1492, 1519. 
91. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel 
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1,320 (Jan. 9, 2012). 
92. Climate Change: Regulatory Initiatives, EPA, http://epa.gov/climatecha 
nge/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html (last visited Dec. 20, 
2012). 
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     including natural gas and shale development.93 The rules 
will  
     limit the release of VOCs and other air pollutants that  
     contribute to tropospheric ozone, a significant GHG  
     precursor gas. They will also indirectly reduce methane  
     emissions, a more potent GHG than CO2. The EPA  
     estimates that these rules will result in an annual reduction  
     of between 1 and 1.7 million tons of methane, equivalent to  
     19 to 33 million metric tons of CO2.94 This translates into  
     removing 4 to 8 million cars from the road each year.95 With  
     natural gas systems accounting for 32% of all methane  
     emissions in 200996 and 11,400 new hydraulically fractured  
     wells drilled each year, these new rules are an important  
     first step for regulating emissions from oil and gas  
     development.97 
 
Agencies have taken a number of other smaller actions to support 
mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. These include 
activities such as launching an online “waste to biogas mapping tool” 
93. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards 
and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 
77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012). 
94. Id. at 49,533–34. The new standards require that most fractured and 
refractured gas wells undertake “green completions” to reduce VOC 
emissions. As the EPA explains, “[i]n a green completion, special 
equipment separates gas and liquid hydrocarbons from the flowback 
that comes from the well as it is being prepared for production. The gas 
and hydrocarbons can then be treated and used or sold, avoiding the 
waste of natural resources that cannot be renewed.” EPA, EPA Fact 
Sheet: Overview of the Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil 
and Natural Gas Industry 1 (Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter EPA Fact 
Sheet: Air Regulations for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry], available 
atjhttp://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf. 
Because developers can capture the methane and sell it as natural gas 
that would otherwise be leaked, vented or flared, the new rules should 
be cost-effective, perhaps even profitable: EPA’s estimates that the rules 
will save producers $11 to $19 million when the rules are fully 
implemented in 2015. Id. 
95. Michael Obeiter, WRI INSIGHTS, How the EPA’s New Oil and Gas 
Standards Will Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (May 9, 2012), 
http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/05/how-epas-new-oil-and-gas-
standards-will-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissions. 
96. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–
2010, at 2–3, Table 2-1 (2012) [hereinafter EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS]. 
97. EPA Fact Sheet: Air Regulations for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry, 
supra note 94, at 1. 
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to support the use of organic waste for energy projects,98 establishing 
a Green Power Partnership to promote the use of renewable energy,99 
and identifying ways that indigenous peoples can increase their ability 
to adapt to climate change impacts.100 
IV. Options for the President’s Future Climate 
Change Agenda 
The president’s initiatives, undertaken pursuant to the Clean Air 
Act and other statutes, are a significant step forward for the United 
States. Considering previous policies of the Bush and Clinton 
Administrations alike, these steps indicate a real policy to address 
climate change across a broad spectrum of economic activities and 
actors. 
These initiatives of the President are all good. The problem, 
however, is that they are not good enough. Nobody anticipates that 
these measures alone will allow the United States to reach its pledges 
to reduce its emissions by 17% by 2020 or 83% by 2050. (These 
pledges are enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord101 and iterated in the 
Cancun Agreements102 to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.103) For example, the EPA and the NHTSA estimate that the 
two new standards for light duty vehicles will reduce GHG emissions 
by approximately 35% by 2035.104 While these rules may help us get 
to the 2020 goal of reducing emissions by 17%—at least from this one 
economic sector—they will not help the United States reach an 83% 
reduction without significantly higher emissions standards or a 
structural change in the way we power automobiles. Similarly, the 
two agencies estimate the new standards for medium- and heavy-duty 
vehicles will reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 270 million 
98. Press Release, EPA, EPA Launches First Waste to Biogas Mapping 
Tool (June 7, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpr 
ess.nsf/0/6CB45E4A9E7EA92C85257A16005838BE. 
99. See Green Power Partnership, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/ 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
100. Press Release, NOAA, NOAA Partners Meet to Explore Climate 
Change and Coastal Tribes (July 17, 2012), available at http://www.no 
aanews.noaa.gov/stories2012/20120717_firststewardssymposium.html. 
101. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 7; see also BLUEPRINT FOR A 
SECURE ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 8, at 24.  
102. See UNFCC, Cancun Agreements, supra note 7. 
103. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, entered into force Mar. 
21, 1994, S. TREATY DOC NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.  
104. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Proposed 
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854, 74,964 (Dec. 1, 2011). 
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metric tons over the life of vehicles sold during the 2014 through 2018 
model years105—a small fraction of emissions from this rapidly growing 
sector.106 Similarly, the GHG reductions resulting from the NSPS 
standards for coal-fired power plants are even less encouraging: 
research indicates that the new standards, even if improved, would 
reduce total U.S. CO2 emission by roughly 2 to 5%.107 Under current 
policies, no sector will come close to achieving 83% reductions by 
2050.108  
105. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 
Medium-and-Heavy Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 
(Sept. 15, 2011). 
106. Total emissions from medium- and heavy-duty vehicles was 402.3 
Teragram CO2 Eq. in 2010. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra note 96, at 22-2, Table 2-15. 1 Teragram 
equals 1 million metric tons. The percentage reduction in GHGs differs 
for each class of vehicles. For example, the final standards for heavy-
duty vehicles for 2018 (including a separate standard to control air 
conditioning system leakage) represent an average per-vehicle reduction 
in GHGs of 17 percent for diesel vehicles and 12 percent for gasoline 
vehicles, compared to a common baseline, while for other classes of 
vehicles. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency 
Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles , 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,119. For a 2017 model “Class 2b–8 vocational vehicle,” 
however, the new standards represent only a 6 to 9% reduction in CO2 
emissions over a 2010 model year vehicle.” Id. at 57,121. 
107. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT: STRUCTURE, EFFECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF A 
KNOWABLE PATHWAY 36 (2010), (citing EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENT FOR THE ANPRM: STATIONARY SOURCES 16–17 (1997)). The 
paper notes that EPA’s estimates show potential reductions of 4 to 10%, 
but that actual reductions are dependent on certain variables, such as 
the configuration of the plant’s boiler and the availability of local, low-
cost biomass. In contrast, “[a] flexible efficiency standard calibrated to 
reduce coal heat input by 10 percent per unit of electricity generated by 
coal could capture potential improvements in efficiency and from 
biomass cofiring.” Id. at 43–44. One report does conclude that the 
United States may achieve reductions of 16.3% from 2005 levels in 2020. 
Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman, U.S. Status on Climate Change 
Mitigation 1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper, Oct. 2012). 
However, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that 
U.S. CO2 will be only 9% below 2005 levels by 2020. U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 12 
n.6 (2012). Burtraw and Woerman reach more optimistic conclusions 
because they assume full implementation of regulations that have not 
yet been promulgated.  
108. See, e.g., NICHOLAS M. BIANCO & FRANK T. LITZ, WORLD RESOURCES 
INST., REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
USING EXISTING FEDERAL AUTHORITIES AND STATE ACTION 2 (2010) 
(stating that even under the most aggressive scenario contemplated by 
their report, the actions will “fall short of President Obama’s 
Copenhagen pledge to reduce emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 
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So where does this leave us? While Congressional action is clearly 
desirable, and in some circumstances necessary, the executive can do 
much more to put us closer to the U.S. pledge of a 17% reduction by 
2020 based on 2005 GHG emissions levels and 83% by 2050. First, the 
Obama Administration has relied on a purely domestic strategy. It 
must take a much more positive leadership role in international 
negotiations—the kind of leadership that is needed to sharply reduce 
GHG emissions. Second, efforts to reduce CO2 emissions must be 
strengthened, particularly with respect to existing fossil fuel fired 
power plants. Third, while CO2 is at the heart of any long-term 
strategy to abate climate change, the mitigation of short-lived climate 
forcers such as black carbon, methane, and tropospheric ozone could 
bring substantial short-term climate benefits. Fourth, none of the 
approaches adopted so far force radical changes in technology—the 
kind of changes needed to transform the United States to a low-
carbon economy. Through climate change technology prizes and other 
fiscal policies, the president can foster the growth of alternative 
energy supplies that can end our reliance on fossil fuels.  
A. International Leadership 
The president has several opportunities to flex his treaty-making 
authority to strengthen the climate change efforts across a range of 
international agreements. These include the climate change regime 
itself, as well as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the 
World Trade Organization. 
1. UNFCCC Climate Negotiations 
The negotiations within the climate change regime are complex, 
and are currently addressing a wide variety of economic activities and 
socio-economic considerations. Yet, it is clear that the United States 
is a major stumbling block to achieving meaningful mitigation 
commitments. To be sure, the United States is not alone. Canada, 
Japan, and Russia, among developed countries, and large-emitting 
developing countries like China, India, and South Korea, have shown 
little interest in making meaningful commitments. Long-time 
observers of the climate process, however, lay most of the blame at 
the feet of the United States, not because the United States is the 
biggest historic emitter of GHGs or because it is the world’s largest 
economy, but rather because it has done more to slow progress on a 
package of international commitments than other countries.109 
2020.”); Adler, supra note 39, at 444 (stating that the regulatory 
changes made under the Clean Air Act are “unlikely to come anywhere 
close to the aspirational goal of reducing emissions 80% by 2050.”). 
109. Tom Athanasiou of Ecoequity sums up the views of many climate 
negotiation observers:  
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The stated reasons for the U.S. positions are well known. In 1997, 
the Senate made clear that it would not give its consent to 
ratification unless developing countries also made commitments to 
reduce GHG emissions.110 These concerns arise from fears that U.S. 
businesses would be at a competitive disadvantage if they must pay 
the cost of CO2 abatement while their competitors in developing 
countries do not.111 
Much time has passed since 1997. Research indicates that fears of 
a competitiveness effect are overstated, except for those industries 
with the highest energy use, or that studies finding a competitiveness 
effect failed to take into account the cost of climate change 
adaptation.112 But more to the point, this is a crisis of leadership, 
both in the White House and in the Senate. The United States 
remains the largest historic emitter of GHGs by far: 28.52% of CO2 
It’s the US, after all, that reduced the Kyoto Protocol to a non-
starter, and the US that led the Copenhagen charge to abandon 
top-down emissions targets in favor of bottom-up “pledge and 
review.” It’s the US that, in the words of chief negotiator Todd 
Stern, is looking for a “new paradigm for climate diplomacy” 
that asserts a world in which the developed countries are no 
longer presumed to bear the overarching, if inconvenient, 
obligations of the rich and the responsible. 
 
 Tom Athanasiou, Who’s to Blame for the Impasse in Global Climate 
Talks?, EARTH ISLAND J. (Winter 2011), http://www.earthisland.org 
/journal/index.php/eij/article/whos_to_blame_for_the_impasse_in_g
lobal_climate_talks/. 
110. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). 
111. See TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. & WORLD 
RESOURCES INST., LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD 2 (2008).  
112. See, e.g., id. at 10–12 (arguing past energy regulations have given 
companies competitive advantages abroad, thus improving profits). 
Another analysis concluded: 
We find that higher energy prices, of the sort associated with 
pricing CO2 at $15 per ton, would lead to an average production 
decline of 1.3 percent across U.S. manufacturing, but also a 0.6 
percent decline in consumption (defined as production plus net 
imports). This suggests only a 0.7 percent shift in production 
overseas. There is no statistically discernible effect on 
employment for the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
 
 JOSEPH E. ALDY & WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE COMPETITIVENESS IMPACTS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICIES iv (2009). See also Corrado 
Di Maria & Edwin van der Werf, Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral 
Change Policy with Directed Technical Change, 39 ENVTL. RES. ECON. 
55, 57, 69–70 (2008) (concluding that a shift to greater carbon efficiency 
will give rise to new industry standards where technological 
improvements are disbursed even to countries without restrictions on 
carbon emissions). 
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from energy, whereas eighty seven developing countries have historic 
emissions of 0.90% of the world’s total.113 China does have relatively 
high historic emissions of 9.36%, but India, another country 
frequently mentioned as an industrial competitor, has historic 
emissions of just 2.52%.114 
In addition, the United States has one of the highest per capita 
emissions rates: 17.3 tons in per capita emissions in 2011,115 although 
this is a steep recession-caused decline from 22.9 tons per person in 
2005.116 China, in comparison, has per capita emissions less than half 
that at 7.2 tons per capita.117 India has emissions of just 1.6 tons per 
capita.118 
In other words, the emissions of India in particular, but also 
China to a lesser extent, must increase dramatically before they reach 
U.S. levels. To honor the commitment to “take the lead” to abate 
climate change,119 the United States must show real leadership—
leadership it has so far been unwilling to demonstrate. The U.S. 
executive branch has been all too willing to hide behind the Senate’s 
stated refusal to provide its advice to ratification. In the same way 
that President Obama showed leadership to get a version of a 
national health care system adopted—something presidents since 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt have failed to achieve—President Obama 
can and should lead the United States at the international climate 
change negotiations. 
2. International Aviation 
Under the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 
any airline, regardless of country of origin, must reduce its emissions 
from flights departing and arriving from cities within the EU by 3% 
of 2006 levels by 2013 and 5% by 2020.120 Airlines may achieve these 
113. See Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), supra note 12.  
114. Id.  
115. JOS G.J. OLIVIER ET AL., TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS 6 (2012). 
116. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, supra note 12.  
117. OLIVIER ET AL., supra note 115, at 29, Table A1.3. 
118. Id.  
119. Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC provides that “the developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.” UNFCCC, supra note 9, art. 3.1. 
120. See Keith Laing, Enviros Argue Emissions Trading is Working in 
Europe, THE HILL (Oct. 17, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/transportation-report/aviation/262539-enviros-argue-emissions-
trading-is-working-in-europe; see also Council Directive 2003/87 2003 
O.J. (L 275) 32, 32 (EU). For more on the EU ETS, see generally 
European Commission, Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EURO. 
COMM’N (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/polic 
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targets by purchasing credits for pollution. This is a fairly modest 
plan. First, a recent study concluded that the U.S. airline industry 
could collectively receive a windfall gain of $2.6 billion from the ETS 
requirements.121 Second, despite improvements in jet engines that 
have made new engines 70% more fuel efficient than those produced 
40 years ago, and 20% more fuel efficient than 10 years ago, CO2 
emissions from airplanes nearly doubled between 1990 and 2006, and 
they are expected to grow by 2% to 3% per year unless further action 
is taken.122  
Despite this modest plan and potential profit to the industry, the 
United States and other countries have asked the European Union to 
suspend or delay its plans to include U.S. and other non-EU airlines 
in the European Trading Scheme.123 Transportation Secretary Ray 
LaHood has decried “the EU’s go-it-alone approach” as “impeding 
ies/ets/index_en.htm (explaining the EU ETS’s “cap and trade” 
principle of carbon emissions). 
121. Robert Malina et al., The Impact of the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme on US Aviation, 19 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 36, 40 
(2012). The authors made the following conclusions: 
We forecast the potential impact of the EU-ETS on US airlines 
from 2012 to 2020. Reflecting current market behavior, we 
modeled an emissions price of €15/tCO2 in 2010 that increased 
by 4% per year. We considered three cost pass-through 
assumptions. In our modeling framework, CO2 emissions from 
US airlines between 2011 and 2020 increased by 35% in the 
reference scenario and 32% under the EU-ETS when there is full 
cost pass-through. The small reduction in aviation emissions 
reflects high abatement costs in aviation relative to abatement 
costs in other industries. When there is full cost pass-through, 
airlines received windfall gains of $2.6 billion from the 
grandfathering of allowances. 
 Id. 
122. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Group on International Aviation and 
Climate Change (GIACC) Report, ¶¶ 1.1.2–1.1.3, (June 1, 2009) 
[hereinafter ICAO, GIACC Report]; UNFCC, Information Relevant to 
Emissions from Fuel Used for International Aviation and Maritime 
Transport, ¶ 4.4, FCCC/SBSTA/2010/MISC.5 (May 20, 2010). 
123. In February 2012, more than 20 countries, including the United, China, 
India, and Russia, met in Moscow to agree on a basket of possible 
countermeasures against the inclusion of aviation in the EU scheme. 
Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting on Inclusion of International 
Civil Aviation in the EU-ETS, Feb. 22, 2012, available at www.gre 
enaironline.com/photos/Moscow_Declaration.pdf. The aviation industry 
also opposes the application the EU ETS to it, recently issuing a 
declaration “urging governments to reach agreement at the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for a global framework for 
reduction of emissions from aircraft operations using technology 
development.” Toward Sustainable Aviation, 6th Aviation & 
Environment Summit, ¶ 6, Mar. 22, 2012. 
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international progress on a multilateral agreement for international 
aviation.”124 The irony of the statement is stunning, given the United 
States’ “go-it-alone” approach to the entire issue of climate change. 
Moreover, President Obama has not ruled out using international 
dispute settlement to resolve the issue,125 and, in a remarkable 
departure from respect for the rule of law, President Obama signed 
legislation “exempting” U.S. airlines from compliance with the EU 
ETS.126 This is not climate leadership. 
Instead, the United States suggests that the EU should negotiate 
through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an 
international organization that has failed to proscribe any emissions 
reductions. ICAO, which was established under the 1944 Convention 
on International Civil Aviation,127 has the authority to regulate, 
among other things, emissions from international aviation. ICAO’s 
governing Council has not imposed mandatory obligations on ICAO 
parties to mitigate CO2 emissions from aircraft. It has, however, 
approved an annual improvement in fuel efficiency of 2% between 
2013 and 2020 and an aspirational global fuel efficiency improvement 
rate of 2% per year from 2021 to 2050.128 If these goals are met, 
cumulative fuel efficiency from aviation would improve approximately 
60% from 2005 levels.129 Still, ICAO does not appear to be an 
institution that will establish any requirements unless pushed. 
Leadership from the EU with corresponding leadership from President 
Obama could provide the impetus ICAO needs to finally take GHG 
mitigation seriously. 
124. Ray LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., Statement at Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 3 (June 6, 2012), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=9f35bb3b-
c8bd-4ee0-87aa-57819b7b914f. 
125. See Letter from Aerospace Industries Association et al. to Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, & Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of 
Transp. (July 30, 2012), available at http://www.nbaa.org/ops/envi 
ronment/eu-ets/20120731-coalition-letter-us-hosted-aviation-climate-
meeting.pdf; Special Briefing, Preview of the EU Emissions Trading 
System Meeting, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (July 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/195781.htm. 
126. Senator John Thune, for example, has introduced a Senate bill that 
would prohibit U.S. airlines from participating in the EU ETS. 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, 
S.1956, 112th Cong., § 2 (Dec. 7, 2011). President Obama signed the 
legislation on November 27, 2012. 
127. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
128. ICAO, Declaration by the High-level Meeting on International Aviation 
and Climate Change, ¶ 2.2, HLM-ENV/09-WP/7 (Oct. 8, 2009). 
129. IACO, GIACC Report, supra note 122, para. 3.7.1. 
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President Obama should send a clear, positive message: The 
United States will not litigate this issue before an international 
tribunal as the airline industry wishes, and he will veto any legislation 
that seeks to exempt U.S. airlines from compliance with the EU ETS. 
He should also negotiate standards similar to those of the EU ETS 
within ICAO. 
3. International Trade  
The rules of international trade, particularly those administered 
by the World Trade Organization, provide many opportunities for 
pursuing climate change benefits. In fact, international trade policy is 
an area that has much unfilled potential to encourage the 
dissemination of climate change technologies worldwide, thus lowering 
the cost of climate mitigation.  
a. Climate Change Friendly Goods and Services 
A central goal of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)130 is the negotiation and application of nondiscriminatory 
tariffs—the tax imposed on goods as a condition of importation. As 
part of the current Doha Round of negotiations, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members have agreed to reduce or eliminate 
tariffs on environmental goods and services.131 The negotiations, 
however, have been slowed by the inability of WTO members to agree 
on a list of qualified environmental goods and services. Defining what 
are “environmental” goods and services has also proven more 
challenging than it appears.  
Consider two approaches in the climate change context. Under 
the first approach, climate change mitigation technologies (and 
services) would be defined in relation to a specific good or end-use.132 
Thus, goods such as solar photovoltaic panels and wind turbines 
would be slated for tariff reduction or elimination. The second 
approach would cast a wider net and include “environmentally 
preferable products” from a climate change perspective.133 Under this 
approach, a product that causes less harm to the climate than 
alternative products would be subject to tariff reduction or 
130. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194, arts. I, II:1(a) [hereinafter GATT]. 
131. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, ¶ 31(iii), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
When citing WTO sources, this article utilizes the date adopted and the 
date published, as available. 
132. Mahesh Sugathan, Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Climate 
Change Benefits from Liberalisation of Environment Goods and 
Services, in LINKING TRADE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY 8 (2006). 
133. Id.  
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elimination.134 The trouble with this second approach is determining 
exactly when a product is more climate change friendly than an 
alternative product. For example, corn-based ethanol may or may not 
result in lower greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels; it depends 
on how much of the production lifecycle is included in the calculation, 
how the corn was grown, and how the ethanol was produced.135 In 
addition, use of corn-based ethanol results in much higher emissions 
than sugarcane-based ethanol.136 Moreover, technology developments 
may make both products substantially inferior to cellulosic ethanol.137 
If current technologies receive preferential treatment such as a zero 
tariff, then it will be difficult, if not impossible, to provide more 
beneficial trade advantages to future, superior technologies. The same 
problems hold true for attempts to reduce tariffs for appliances and 
other products that are energy efficient. In addition, the 
establishment of separate tariffs for specific products, such as energy 
efficient dishwashers, would require governments to establish a new 
tariff classification,138 a process that may not be as straightforward as 
it might seem.139 
Nonetheless, focusing on climate change related technologies could 
help narrow these concerns and forge an agreement. A wide range of 
climate change related technologies, including wind turbines, solar 
panels, geothermal energy sensors, and fuel cells, could be considered 
environmental goods. Reducing or eliminating tariffs of these 
technologies would reduce their cost and encourage their use and 
134. Id.  
135. See Bruce A. Babcock et al., Is Corn Ethanol a Low-Carbon Fuel?, 
IOWA AG. REV., Fall 2007, at 1–3, 10. 
136. See Suani Teixeira Coelho et al., São Paulo State Secretariat for the 
Environment, The Brazilian Experience with Sugarcane Ethanol, in 
LINKING TRADE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY 28 (2006).  
137. See Ohio Envt’l Council, Fact Sheet: Ethanol, Options for Sustainable 
Energy Future, available at http://www.theoec.org/PDFs/FactSheets/ 
FactSheet_Ethanol.pdf (discussing the advantages of cellulosic ethanol).  
138. Sugathan, supra note 132, at 8–9.  
139. See WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
45–72 (2008). Because many industries vigorously defend their tariff 
preferences and protections, this option may be politically difficult to 
achieve. Another concern with both approaches for many countries is 
that a reduction in the tariffs to benefit a specific technology may lead 
to a tariff reduction for other technologies unrelated to climate change. 
For example, India classifies solar photovoltaic panels as “Other” under 
the subclassification of light emitting diodes (LEDs). An effort to reduce 
tariffs for solar photovoltaic panels may thus lead to a tariff reduction in 
all “Other” LEDs. While India could always reclassify photovoltaic 
panels, the example highlights why the negotiations are not 
straightforward. 
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dissemination. A World Bank report concluded that removing tariffs 
for four basic clean energy technologies (wind, solar, clean coal, and 
efficient lighting) in eighteen of the high-GHG-emitting developing 
countries could result in trade gains of up to 7% (and up to 14% if 
nontariff barriers are also removed).140 If translated into emissions 
reductions, these trade gains suggest that—even within a small subset 
of clean energy technologies for a select group of countries—the 
impact of trade liberalization on GHG emissions could be significant.  
President Obama should take the lead by encouraging the Office 
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate an 
agreement on climate change friendly goods and services, even if the 
list begins as a very short list. Even a short list would show that 
trade policy can in fact be climate-friendly. It could also help promote 
the diffusion of climate change technologies around the world.  
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), whose 
twenty one members include the United States,141 has recently shown 
the way forward. The members of APEC agreed to reduce applied 
tariff rates to 5% or less by the end of 2015 on a range of 
environmental goods.142 Many of these goods will benefit climate 
change, including biomass boilers, parts that are integral components 
to wind turbines, and solar water heaters, among other products.143 If 
obstacles to negotiating a similar agreement in the WTO become 
insurmountable, alternate forums, such as bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements, may provide opportunities for agreements similar to 
the APEC agreement. 
b. Climate Change and “Like Product” 
The GATT imposes a number of obligations on WTO members to 
prevent them from using nontariff barriers, including taxes, 
administrative procedures, and other laws and regulations, to protect 
domestic industries from foreign competition. Three of these 
obligations are at the center of trade-environment disputes as well as 
the design of climate change policies.144  
140. Id. at 72. 
141. See Member Economies, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
(APEC),Jhttp://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Econ 
omiesaspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).  
142. APEC, 20th Economic Leaders’ Declaration, APEC List of 
Environmental Goods, at Annex C, Sept. 8–9, 2012, available at http:// 
www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2012/2012_ 
aelm/2012_aelm_annexC.aspx. 
143. Id. 
144. For more on “trade–environment” disputes, see generally CHRIS WOLD, 
SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW 
AND POLICY (2d ed. 2011). 
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First, the most favored nation (MFN) obligation of GATT Article 
I requires each WTO member to tax and regulate imported “like 
products” from all other WTO members the same.145 For example, 
Mexico cannot tax solar panels from Germany less than solar panels 
from Japan. Second, the national treatment principle of GATT 
Article III requires a country to tax and regulate imported products 
“no less favourably” than “like” domestic products.146 Thus, the 
United States may impose a tax on imports of HFC-23, a powerful 
greenhouse gas, provided that the tax rate is no more than the tax 
imposed on domestically-produced HFC-23. Third, GATT Article XI 
prohibits members from applying any restrictions, such as quotas and 
licensing schemes, other than tariffs on the importation or exportation 
of products.147 Thus, as explored below, the U.S. embargo on Mexican 
tuna in the Tuna/Dolphin I dispute violated Article XI.148 
A central question for both the MFN and national treatment 
nondiscrimination obligations is whether a trade measure relates to 
“like products.” Quite obviously, governments may tax and regulate 
wind turbines differently from automobiles and coal differently from 
solar panels. At some point, however, products become so similar that 
trade rules demand equal tax and regulatory treatment to ensure fair 
competition in the global marketplace. The issue of “like products” 
raises difficult questions. Is electricity from coal the same as 
electricity from wind power? Are hybrid, electric, and traditional gas-
powered automobiles like products that require equivalent tax and 
regulatory treatment? 
WTO dispute settlement panels make “like products” 
determinations by assessing, on a case-by-case basis, the following 
four factors: 1) the products’ end-uses in a given market; 2) 
consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; 
3) the products’ properties, nature, and quality; and 4) tariff 
classification of the products in question.149 The simplicity of this 
four-part test masks the complexities of the national treatment 
obligation, which alters the meaning of “likeness” depending on the 
circumstances. For example, panels have defined “like products” 
narrowly with respect to taxes, provided they are not imposed to 
145. GATT, supra note 130, art. I. 
146. Id. art. III. 
147. Id. art. IX. 
148. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.18, 
WT/DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]. 
149. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, at 20 (published 
Oct. 4, 1996) (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages II]. 
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protect domestic production.150 If that condition is met, then natural 
gas and coal, because of their different physical characteristics, are 
probably not like products despite their similar end uses; they could 
be taxed differently. However, taxes designed to afford protection to 
domestic production expand the concept of like products to include 
“directly competitive and substitutable products.”151 Under this 
expanded concept of likeness, the WTO’s Appellate Body has found 
shochu, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs to be 
“directly competitive and substitutable.”152 For regulatory measures, 
the definition of “like product” fits somewhere between these two 
points but significantly closer to the broader reading of “directly 
competitive and substitutable products.” 
Whatever ambiguity exists in the interpretation of “like 
products,” trade panels have been absolutely clear that factors 
unrelated to the product as a product cannot be used as the basis for 
taxing or regulating products differently. Thus, in the Tuna/Dolphin 
disputes, dispute settlement panels found U.S. import restrictions on 
tuna to be impermissible because the basis for barring imports into 
the United States related to the way the fish were caught, not some 
physical characteristic of the tuna itself.153 Processes and production 
methods (PPMs), such as fish harvesting techniques that do not affect 
the product as a product (non-product related PPMs), cannot be used 
to distinguish otherwise like products for tax and regulatory 
purposes.154 Similarly, a dispute settlement panel found U.S. rules that 
imposed different requirements on foreign gasoline than domestic 
gasoline impermissible because those rules related to data held by a 
foreign company, not the gasoline itself.155 On the other hand, 
150. See id. (“How narrowly is a matter that should be determined 
separately for each tax measure in each case.”). 
151. See id. at 26 (asserting that “like products” and “directly competitive or 
substitutable products” mean “one and the same thing.”). 
152. Id. 
153. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 148, at ¶¶ 5.17–5.18 (finding that U.S. 
quantitative restriction on tuna importation was impermissible, as it 
dealt more with dolphin conservation than physical characteristics of the 
fish). 
154. See id. at ¶¶ 3.17–3.18, 5.14-5.16; see also Report of the Panel, United 
States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶¶ 3.5–3.6, DS29/R (published 
June 16, 1994) (unadopted);  Appellate Body Report, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 42, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (published Oct. 12, 1998) (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) 
(concluding that the United States restrictions on shrimp imports 
violated the GATT because the restrictions were based on whether a 
country protected sea turtles). 
155. Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.13, WT/DS2/R (published Jan. 29, 1996) 
(adopted as modified by the Appellate Body May 20, 1996). 
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product-related PPMs, such as irradiation and pasteurization, may be 
used to distinguish products for tax and regulatory purposes (that is, 
pasteurized milk may be taxed and regulated differently from non-
pasteurized milk). These rulings complicate efforts to tax or regulate 
climate-friendly technologies more favorably than other products. 
To remove ambiguity concerning the meaning of “like product,” 
the president, through USTR, could seek a binding interpretation156 of 
WTO members on the meaning of “like product” for a range of 
climate-related products and technologies. For example, the 
interpretation of “like product” could specify that electric cars are not 
“like” fossil fuel powered cars and that electricity from renewable 
sources is not “like” electricity produced from fossil fuels. Even among 
fossil fuel powered automobiles, the interpretation could make clear 
that vehicles with high fuel economy are not like vehicles with low 
fuel economy, even if they are in other respects very similar. 
Similarly, an energy efficient appliance could be defined as not “like” 
a less energy efficient appliance of the same kind.  
c. A Climate Subsidies Agreement 
The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Agreement)157 does not judge subsidies based on their policy 
objective. Rather, it prohibits subsidies that distort trade by causing 
material injury or serious prejudice to industries in other countries 
(for example, by suppressing prices or displacing imports of 
nonsubsidized products).158 Subsidies that promote climate change 
mitigation, such as subsidies for solar panels, may result in trade 
distortions just like any other subsidy, including fossil fuel subsidies, 
by providing an unfair advantage for the country’s solar panels in the 
marketplace.159 In fact, some U.S. producers of solar panels 
successfully challenged imports of solar panels from China, claiming 
156. See GATT, supra note 130, art. IX. Article IX(2) of the WTO 
Agreement provides that WTO Members have the authority to adopt 
“interpretations” by a three-fourths majority vote. The WTO members 
could also use a waiver, as provided by Article IX(3) of the WTO 
Agreement. Waivers are to be used only in exceptional circumstances, 
subject to approval by at least three-fourths of the WTO membership. 
Unlike an interpretation, however, a waiver is time-limited and must be 
renewed periodically. Id.  
157. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
158. Id. art. 3.  
159. For more on fossil fuel subsidies, and in particular the role of 
international trade policy, see Chris Wold, Grant Wilson & Sara 
Foroshani, Leveraging Climate Change Benefits through the World 
Trade Organization: Are Fossil Fuel Subsidies Actionable?, 43 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 635 (2012). 
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those panels were subsidized and causing material injury to the U.S. 
solar panel industry.160 Where a subsidy distorts trade by causing 
material injury or serious prejudice to another country’s industry, the 
harmed country may retaliate with countervailing duties or 
countermeasures.161 
To fall within the scope of the SCM Agreement, a government 
must provide a financial contribution, such as the transfer of funds or 
the provision of goods or services that confers a benefit on the 
recipient.162 The subsidy must also be “specific” to a limited group of 
enterprises.163 For example, a subsidy limited to producers of 
renewable energy or certain types of climate change mitigation 
technologies might be deemed a specific subsidy because it is available 
in fact or in law only to certain enterprises or industries. The WTO 
panel’s decision in United States-Cotton suggests that even a 
relatively large number of recipients may lead to a “specificity” 
finding. In that case, the Panel concluded that crop insurance 
subsidies available for about 100 different crops were available to “a 
sufficiently discrete segment of the United States economy to qualify 
160. In a related action, the Department of Commerce also imposed anti-
dumping duties on imports of Chinese of solar cells from certain 
manufacturers from 31.14% to 249.96%. For determinations relating to 
both the subsidies determination and the dumping determination, see 
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into 
Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Critical 
Circumstances Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 63,788 (Oct. 17, 2012); 
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China, 
Investigation Nos. 701–TA–481 and 731–TA–1190 (Final), USITC 
Publication 4360 (Nov. 2012).  
161. Countervailing duties arise from “material injury” actions initiative 
through a WTO member’s administrative processes. Countervailing 
duties are increased duties to offset the harm caused by the subsidy. See 
SCM Agreement, supra note 157, arts. 10–23. Countermeasures arise 
from either “material injury” or “serious prejudice” actions initiated in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Id. arts. 7.1, 7.9. Countermeasures 
may include increased duties on products but they may also include the 
suspension of other WTO-related rights, including intellectual property 
rights arising under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights.  
162. Id. art. 1.1. 
163. Id. art. 2. 
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as ‘specific.’”164 If subsidies distort trade and are considered specific, 
they are subject to retaliatory trade sanctions.165 
 The executive has several options for using the SCM Agreement 
for climate change purposes. First, the United States could challenge 
the fossil fuel subsidies of other WTO members. This option is 
unlikely as it would probably invoke a retaliatory trade dispute 
concerning U.S. fossil fuel subsidies, which may be as high as $52 
billion annually.166 Of course, the United States could use the SCM 
Agreement as a reason to eliminate its own fossil fuel subsidies or its 
subsidies for corn production,167 which are used to make ethanol. 
WTO panels have concluded that U.S. cotton subsidies168 and EU 
sugar169 subsidies are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, and it is 
highly likely that they would draw the same conclusions with respect 
to U.S. corn subsidies.170 If the United States fails to act unilaterally, 
perhaps the WTO will direct it to remove corn subsidies; Canada and 
Brazil have lodged a WTO dispute,171 although the case appears 
moribund. 
164. See Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1150, 
WT/DS267/R (published Sept. 8, 2004) (adopted Mar. 21, 2005); aff’d 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton,  ¶ 
543, WT/DS267/AB/R (published Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. 
Subsidies on Upland Cotton]. 
165. SCM Agreement, supra note 157, arts. 7, 19. 
166. Mark Clayton, Budget Hawks: Does US Need to Give Gas and Oil 
Companies $41 Billion a Year?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 9, 2011, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0309/Budget-hawks-
Does-US-need-to-give-gas-and-oil-companies-41-billion-a-year. 
167. Corn and soybean producers collectively receive about 80% of total 
subsidy payments of $8 to $14 billion annually. See Vincent Smith et 
al., Field of Schemes: The Taxpayer and Economic Welfare Costs of 
Shallow-Loss Farming Programs 26 (Am. Enter. Inst. of Pub. Pol’y 
Res., Working Paper No. 2012-01), available at http://www.aei.org 
/files/2012/05/29/-field-of-schemes-the-taxpayer-and-economic-welfare-
costs-of-shallowloss-farming-programs_173428924992.pdf. 
168. U.S. Subsidies on Upland Cotton, supra note 164, ¶ 7.1150. 
169. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Export Subsidies 
on Sugar, ¶¶ 340–41, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, 
WT/DS283/AB/R (published April 28, 2005) (adopted May 19, 2005).  
170. That U.S. corn subsidies distort the world market for corn is plain. For 
example, Mexican farmers are actually reducing their corn prices below 
costs of production to compete with U.S. corn. Timothy A. Wise, The 
Paradox of Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement Issues, Agricultural 
Dumping and Policy Reform 14–15 (Global Dev. and Env’t Inst. 
Working Paper No. 04-02, 2004), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/  
gdae/Pubs/wp/04-02AgSubsidies.pdf. 
171. See Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Subsidies and 
Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS357/1 (Jan. 11, 2007). 
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More positively, the USTR, could seek to negotiate a “Climate 
Change Subsidies Agreement” similar to the one WTO members have 
been negotiating for fisheries subsidies.172 In the fisheries agreement, 
which is not yet completed, WTO members have found common 
ground on a range of permissible and prohibited fisheries subsidies. 
For example, subsidies for artisanal fishing and for the construction of 
water and sanitary waste systems serving fish processing facilities, 
among many others, have been proposed as permissible under the 
SCM Agreement.173 Similarly, the WTO members could agree on the 
types of climate change subsidies, such as those for certain types of 
renewable energy, that would be allowable. Such agreement may not 
be easy, of course. For example, the United States provides enormous 
subsidies for corn production, much of which is turned into ethanol.174 
Sugarcane-based ethanol, however, has an energy balance—the ratio 
of energy contained in the final biofuel product to the energy used to 
produce it—about 5.33 times higher than corn-based ethanol.175 Thus, 
the WTO members would need to determine whether subsidies for all 
kinds of ethanol or just some kinds would be allowable. 
B. The Carbon Agenda  
As noted above, the majority of the Obama Administration’s 
efforts have targeted CO2. When thinking of a long-term approach to 
climate change, this is not only sensible, but necessary. Nonetheless, 
the Obama Administration could do more to mitigate CO2. Many of 
these actions would not be new, but rather close exemptions to 
current rules or increase existing standards.  
1. An NSPS Rule for Existing Fossil Fuel Fired Power Plants 
The NSPS rule for fossil fuel fired power plants is an essential 
step towards reducing emissions in the United States. However, that 
rule only applies to new plants; it does not apply to existing power 
plants that are the greatest source of GHGs in the United States—
40% of all U.S. CO2 emissions and 34% of all U.S. GHG emissions in 
2010.176 Moreover, less than 7% of electricity generation built in the 
172. Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements, 
Annex VIII, TN/RL/W/213 (Nov. 30, 2007). 
173. See id. Annex VIII, arts. I, II; see also Paper from New Zealand, 
Fisheries Subsidies: Exhaustive List of Non-Prohibited Fisheries 
Subsidies, TN/RL/GEN/141 (June 6, 2006). 
174. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF ETHANOL USE ON FOOD 
PRICES AND GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS 2 (2009).  
175. See INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, 2nd Generation Biomass Conversion 
Efficiency 24 (undated), http://www.iata.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
Documents/IATAConversionTechnologiesFinalv2.pdf.  
176. Proposed NSPS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,395; Sources of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, supra note 62. 
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United States since 1990 derives from coal-fired power plants.177 
Industry has already made the shift to natural gas and renewables, 
which will meet the new NSPS without making any modifications. In 
fact, the EPA estimates that 95% of natural gas combined cycle 
(NGCC) power plants built since 2005 will meet the standard.178 
While NGCC plants produce roughly half as much CO2 as coal-fired 
power plants, they still produce, on a U.S. scale, massive amounts of 
CO2 and methane.  In fact, natural gas is defined, in part, as 
comprising at least 70% methane by volume as well as minor amounts 
of other GHGs.179 
As a result, the EPA should establish emission standards for 
existing facilities. This will clearly have important economic 
consequences for these facilities, no doubt the reason the EPA has so 
far refused to impose GHG restrictions on these facilities. Nonetheless, 
imposing standards on existing power plants will likely cause the early 
retirement of the most inefficient existing power plants as well as the 
modification of others. Failure to do so will no doubt extend the life 
of these inefficient facilities as operators seek to avoid meeting the 
standards established for new or modified power plants. 
Similarly, the EPA could set an NSPS for other industries. The 
production of cement requires vast amounts of energy—5% 
globally180—and constitutes the largest source of U.S. CO2 emissions 
177. Letter from Kevin M. Kennedy, U.S. Climate Initiative, World 
Resources Inst., to Lisa Jackson, EPA, available at http:// www.wri. 
org/stories/2012/04/summary-epa-proposed-performancestandards-
power-plant-ghg-emissions.  
178. EPA, Fact Sheet: Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for New Power 
Plants, supra note 61, at 2. 
179. The proposed rule defines “natural gas” as: 
[A] fluid mixture of hydrocarbons (e.g., methane, ethane, or 
propane), composed of at least 70 percent methane by volume or 
that has a gross calorific value between 35 and 41 megajoules 
(MJ) per dry standard cubic meter (950 and 1,100 Btu per dry 
standard cubic foot), that maintains a gaseous state under ISO 
conditions. In addition, natural gas contains 20.0 grains or less 
of total sulfur per 100 standard cubic feet. Finally, natural gas 
does not include the following gaseous fuels: landfill gas, digester 
gas, refinery gas, sour gas, blast furnace gas, coal-derived gas, 
producer gas, coke oven gas, or any gaseous fuel produced in a 
process which might result in highly variable sulfur content or 
heating value. 
 Proposed NSPS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,440. 
180. Madeleine Rubenstein, Emissions from the Cement Industry, EARTH 
INST., COLUMBIA UNIV. BLOG (May 9, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://blogs. 
ei.columbia.edu/2012/05/09/emissions-from-the-cement-industry/. 
Producing one ton of cement requires 4.7 million BTU of energy, 
equivalent to about 400 pounds of coal, and generates almost one ton of 
CO2. Id. During the cement production process, calcium carbonate 
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other than fossil fuel consumption.181 The manufacture of limestone, 
pulp mills, and other industrial facilities also contributes substantial 
emissions of GHGs.182 If the EPA determines that these sources 
contribute “significantly” to the accumulation of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, the EPA is required to establish an NSPS that represents 
the best-demonstrated technology for reducing emissions from that 
category of sources, taking into account the costs of imposing such 
controls.183  
2. Aircraft Emissions  
The Federal Aviation Administration, or perhaps the EPA,184 has 
authority to make operational improvements, such as idle times, flight 
speeds, taxiing, use of reverse thrust, and other practices reducing fuel 
use, that could reduce GHG emissions from 0.7 to 1.4% annually, or 
roughly 10 to 20% by 2030.185 In addition, the EPA has authority 
under the Clean Air Act to promulgate emissions standards for 
aircraft.186 The EPA recently adopted new NOX emissions standards 
(CaCO3) is heated in a cement kiln at a temperature of about 1,450°C 
(2,400°F) to form lime and CO2. The lime is then combined with silica-
containing materials to produce clinker (an intermediate product), with 
the earlier byproduct CO2 released to the atmosphere. GHG emissions. 
EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra 
note 96, at 4-4 to 4-5.  
181. U.S. ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2008, at 28 (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html#industrial. Cement production accounts 
for 0.4% of U.S. GHG emissions. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra note 96, at 2-17, Table 2-12.  
182. See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 
supra note 96, Section 4 (discussing limestone, pulp mill, and other 
industrial facility emissions). 
183. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(f) (2012). 
184. Some disagreement exists regarding EPA’s authority to regulate 
operational improvements. For a discussion of this debate, See, e.g., 
Nathan Richardson, Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act 16–19 
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper, 2012), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129370.  
185. BIANCO & LITZ, supra note 108, at 14.  
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (1996). As with mobile courses, the Administrator may 
propose emissions standards for aircraft only after finding that an “air 
pollutant” emitted by an aircraft engine “in his judgment causes, or 
contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.” § 7571(a)(2)(A). The regulations are 
to take effect “after such period as the Administrator finds necessary  
       . . . to permit the development and application of the requisite 
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance  
       . . . .” § 7571(b). 
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for aircraft engines.187 As aircraft engines contribute about 1% of the 
total U.S. mobile source NOX emissions,188 promulgating new 
standards could provide significant climate change benefits, 
particularly if CO2 standards are set as well. Significantly, the EPA’s 
authority to regulate existing aircraft engines is relatively clear. 
Unlike the provisions for NSPS, which refer to “new” and “modified” 
sources, Section 231 allows the EPA to impose emissions standards on 
“any class or classes of aircraft engines.”189 
3. Marine Vessel Emissions 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that 
ships emitted 1,046 million tons of CO2 in 2007, 3.3% of global 
emissions that year.190 To put this in perspective, only five 
countries—the United States, China, Russia, India, and Japan—
currently have a higher percentage of the world’s total CO2 emissions 
than the global shipping industry. Emissions from shipping are 
expected to grow. Mid-range emissions scenarios indicate that these 
emissions could grow, in the absence of policies, by 200 to 300% by 
2050 as a result of the growth in world trade.191  
CO2 emitted from low quality bunker fuel is the most important 
GHG emitted by ships, but ships also emit CH4, NOX, and HFCs 
(from refrigeration), as well as black carbon and ozone precursor gases 
such as carbon monoxide and non-methane VOCs. 
Table 1: Summary of GHG Emissions from Shipping 
during 2007192 
 International 
shipping 
(million tonnes) 
Total Shipping 
Million 
tonnes 
CO2 
equivalent 
CO2 870 1050 1050 
CH4 Not determined* 0.24 6 
N2O 0.02 0.03 9 
HFC Not determined* 0.0004 ≤ 6 
* A split into domestic and international emissions is not possible. 
187. Control of Air Pollution From Aircraft and Aircraft Engines; Emission 
Standards and Test Procedures, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,342 (June 18, 2012). 
188. Regulatory Announcement: New Emission Standards for New 
Commercial Aircraft Engines, EPA (Nov. 2005), http://www.epa.gov/ 
nonroad/aviation/420f05015.htm.  
189. 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A) .  
190. INT’L MARITIME ORG., SECOND IMO GHG STUDY 2009, at 1 (2009). 
191. Id.  
192. Id. at 3, Table 1.1. 
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The EPA could also adopt emissions standards for marine vessels. 
Section 213(a)(4) of the Clean Air Act provides the EPA with the 
authority to promulgate standards for emissions other than CO, NOX, 
and VOCs from “non-road engines and vehicles,” a category that 
includes ships, provided that the Administrator determines that 
emissions of GHGs from ships are “significant contributors” to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.193 According to the EPA’s own analysis, new 
standards could reduce GHG emissions by 20 to 40 million metric 
tons.194 These reductions would result from efficiency improvements 
from technology retrofits on existing ships, technology or design 
concepts for both new ships and retrofits, and operational 
improvements for all ships.195 Reducing vessel speed by 5 to 10%, 
while increasing time at sea, could reduce CO2 emissions by more 
than 15%.196 Whether the EPA can require a variety of fuel-switching 
or technology-based improvements that reduce GHGs could be the 
subject of debate, because 95% of the fleet calling on U.S. ports is 
foreign-flagged and these vessels will emit many of the CO2 emissions 
on the high seas.197 As several states and environmental organizations 
have petitioned to regulate vessel emissions,198 the EPA will likely 
need to address this issue soon.199 
193. 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4). 
194. EPA, EPA Analysis of the Transportation Sector: Greenhouse Gas and 
Oil Reduction Scenarios 46 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
195. Id. at 43. 
196. A.P. MOLLER-MAERSK GROUP, HEALTH, SAFETY, SECURITY AND 
ENVIRONMENT REPORT 2008, at 30 (2008). 
197. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40506, CARS AND 
CLIMATE: WHAT CAN EPA DO TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES FROM 
MOBILE SOURCES? 12 (2009). 
198. See, e.g., Petition for Rule Making Seeking the Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ocean-Going Vessels, People of the 
State of California Acting by and Through Attorney General Edmund 
G. Brown, Jr. v. Stephen Johnson (Oct. 3, 2007). 
199. The Supreme Court has held that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) could be applied to foreign-flagged cruise ships so long as the 
ADA-required accommodations did not interfere with the ships’ internal 
affairs or require major, permanent modifications to the ships. Spector 
v. Norwegian Cruiseline, 545 U.S. 119, 120 (2005). The United States 
also enforces pollution standards on ships in its territorial waters. See, 
e.g., 36 C.F.R. 13.65(b)(4) (2012). As one author notes, “it might be 
that a distinction needs to be made between operational factors (speed, 
fuel type, etc.), that are easily amenable to control, and permanent 
modifications of the vessel.” MCCARTHY, supra note 197, at 12.  
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4. Other Non-Road Engines and Vehicles 
The same authority that gives the EPA authority to regulate 
vessel emissions also grants it authority to regulate emissions from 
other non-road engines—construction equipment, farm equipment, 
forklifts, outdoor power equipment, lawn and garden equipment, and 
recreational vehicles.200 In 2007, this sector accounted for 199.7 million 
metric tons of CO2 emissions, 3.3% of U.S. 2007 CO2 emissions.201 The 
EPA should ascertain the feasibility of reducing emissions from this 
sector. 
C. Short-lived Climate Forcers  
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for addressing climate change in 
the short term is for the United States and other governments to act 
aggressively on short-lived climate forcers—black carbon, methane 
(CH4), and tropospheric ozone (O3). Short-lived climate forcers are 
frequently considered together because of their chemical links. For 
example, measures to reduce methane have a large impact on global 
and regional warming because methane is a GHG itself and a 
precursor to tropospheric ozone, a powerful GHG.202 Measures to 
reduce black carbon will also reduce concentrations of tropospheric 
ozone, largely through reductions in emissions of carbon monoxide, a 
precursor gas of ozone.203  
The significant role that short-lived climate forcers can play in 
climate change mitigation is underscored by reviewing the effects of 
these substances on radiative forcing.204 These three substances, 
together with industrial gases such as CFCs and HFCs, account for 
more than half of current climate change.205 Because of their short 
atmospheric lifetimes, at least for the short-lived climate forcers, 
efforts to significantly reduce emissions of short-lived climate forcers 
can move us much closer to the goal of maintaining temperature at no 
more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The 2°C goal translates to 
radiative forcing of less than or equal to 2.5 watts per meter squared 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4) (2012). 
201. MCCARTHY, supra note 197, at 13. 
202. UN ENVIR. PROG. & WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., INTEGRATED 
ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSHPERIC OZONE: SUMMARY 
FOR DECISION MAKERS 7 (2011) [hereinafter UNEP & WMO]. 
203. See id. at 1–2 (summarizing the effects of reducing carbon monoxide 
emissions). 
204. Absorbed solar energy is exactly balanced by radiation emitted to space 
by the Earth and atmosphere when the climate system is in equilibrium. 
Factors that disturb this balance, and thus potentially alter the climate, 
are called radiative forcing agents. Alley et al. supra note 14, at 2 n.2. 
205. See infra Table 2. 
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(Wm-2)206 and, with no further increases in emissions of other gases, 
eliminating black carbon, methane, and tropospheric ozone would 
reduce radiative forcing to 0.427 Wm-2. 
Table 2: Radiative Forcing (RF) of Climate Forcers in 
2005 (in Wm-2)207 
Long-lived Climate Forcers RF 
CO2 1.66 
HFCs, PFCs, SF6 0.017 
N2O 0.16 
CFCs, HCFCs and other 
Montreal Protocol Gases 
0.32 
Short-lived Climate Forcers  
Black Carbon 0.90 
Tropospheric Ozone (O3) 0.35 
Methane (CH4) 0.48 
Subtotal 3.878 
Other  
SO2/NOx mix – 2.1 
Land surface changes due to 
deforestation 
– 0.2 
Total 1.578 
 
Of course, the present reality is much more complex than this. 
CO2 emissions will increase, absorption of CO2 by oceans is slowing, 
and efforts to reduce short-lived climate forcers will also eliminate 
emissions of substances that cool the earth by reflecting light back 
into space. Still, the math shows us that significant efforts to reduce 
short-lived climate forcers provide an important opportunity to meet 
the 2°C goal in a relevant timeframe to avoid unmanageable climate 
change impacts. 
A joint report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) indicates that a small 
number of measures relating to black carbon, methane, and 
tropospheric ozone could pack a significant mitigation punch.208 
206. Veerabhadran Ramanathan & Yangyang Xu, The Copenhagen Accord 
for Limiting Global Warming: Criteria, Constraints, and Available 
Avenues, 107 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8055, 8055 (May 4, 2010). 
207. P. Forster et al., Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative 
Forcing, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 131–32 
(Susan Solomon et al., eds., 2007); Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 206, 
at 8056 (for black carbon). 
208. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 2. 
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Specifically, the report suggests that projected warming during the 
2030s could be halved through implementation of these measures to 
reduce short-lived climate forcers.209 In contrast, even a fairly 
aggressive strategy to reduce CO2 “does little to mitigate warming 
over the next 20–30 years.”210 Significant co-benefits to air quality, 
human health, and world food supplies would also result from 
reducing black carbon and tropospheric ozone.211 UNEP has estimated 
the value of avoiding premature deaths relating to exposure to 
tropospheric ozone and PM2.5 (essentially black carbon), and 
premature deaths resulting from measures to reduce methane and 
black carbon, at a staggering $1.7 to 10.9 trillion.212 
1. Black Carbon 
Black carbon, or soot, is a component of fine particle pollution 
emitted from diesel engines, residential stoves, agricultural and forest 
fires, and some industrial facilities.213 Black carbon particles are small, 
typically smaller than a micrometer,214 but nonetheless have a large 
impact on climate change. In the atmosphere, black carbon absorbs 
solar radiation, which heats the surrounding air.215 It also causes 
warming when it is deposited on snow and ice, again, where it absorbs 
solar radiation and accelerates the melting of the snow and ice.216 It 
can also alter cloud formation by warming surrounding air and 
burning off low-level stratus and cumulus clouds, which allows more 
solar radiation to reach the earth’s surface.217 Scientists estimate that 
the contribution of one gram of black carbon to climate change over a 
period of 100 years is 100 to 2,000 times greater than one gram of 
209. Id. at 9–10. 
210. Id. at 10. 
211. See id. at 16–18 (including reduction of premature deaths, improved 
human health, and better crop yields). See also EPA, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON 148 (2012) (expounding on potential 
health benefits) [hereinafter EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK 
CARBON]. 
212. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON, supra note 211, at 148 
(citing UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 122). 
213. Jessica Seddon Wallack & Veerabhadran Ramanathan, The Other 
Climate Changers: Why Black Carbon and Ozone Also Matter, FOREIGN 
AFF., Sept.—Oct. 2009, at 105, 106.  
214. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON, supra note 211, at 20.  
215. Id. at 17.  
216. Id.  
217. Mario Molina et al., Reducing Abrupt Climate Change Risk Using the 
Montreal Protocol and Other Regulatory Actions to Complement Cuts 
in CO2 Emissions, 106 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20616, 20618–19 
(2009). 
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CO2, even though its lifetime is only days to weeks.218 When mixed 
with water soluble aerosols, however, it can create greater cloud cover 
that reflects more solar radiation back into the atmosphere and cools 
the earth.219 For this reason, the precise global warming impact of 
black carbon is still uncertain.220  
Black carbon may also indirectly contribute to global warming. 
For example, because black carbon accelerates the melting of snow 
and ice in the Arctic by absorbing solar radiation (sunlight), it 
contributes to longer ice-free Arctic conditions conducive to opening 
new Arctic navigation routes and new oil production facilities. Both of 
these activities will increase GHG emissions, including emissions of 
black carbon.221  
Black carbon is the second largest warming agent and, while its 
effects are felt nearly everywhere, its effects are felt the most in the 
Arctic and other areas of snow and ice. The Arctic, for example, is 
warming more than twice as fast as the rest of the planet,222 and black 
carbon is a major contributor. By one estimate, black carbon “may be 
responsible for ~0.5–1.4°C of the 1.9°C warming observed in the 
Arctic from 1890 to 2007,” with the largest impact deriving from 
black carbon emissions in northern Eurasia, North America, and 
Asia.223 In the Tibetan Himalayas, black carbon may be responsible 
for 0.6°C of the 1°C warming since the 1950s.224 
Black carbon derives almost exclusively from two major sources: 
the use of fossil fuels and biomass burning.225 Fossil fuels, particularly 
diesel, contribute about 35% of black carbon emissions worldwide.226 
The remaining black carbon emissions are a result of “burning of 
218. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 6. 
219. Molina et al., supra note 217, at 20618–19. 
220. Id. at 20619. See also UNEP & WMO, supra note 202 (describing the 
known effects of black carbon). A just-released study indicates that the 
climate effects of black carbon are worse than previously thought. T.C. 
Bond et al., Bounding the Role of Black Carbon in the Climate System: 
A Scientific Assessment, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. ATMOSPHERES, 
forthcoming 2013, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1 
002/jgrd.50171/abstract. 
221. See Erika Rosenthal & Robert Watson, Multilateral Efforts to Reduce 
Black Carbon Emissions: A Lifeline for the Warming Arctic?, 20 REV. 
EUR. COMM. & INT. ENV’TL L. 3, 4−5 (2011). 
222. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Global Warming and the 
Arctic FAQs, http://www.c2es.org/science-impacts/basics/faqs/arctic 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
223. Molina et al., supra note 217, at 20619. 
224. Id.  
225. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 6. 
226. Wallack & Ramanathan, supra note 213, at 107. 
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biomass from forest fires, man-made fires for clearing cropland, and 
the use of organic fuels for cooking, heating, and small-scale 
industry.”227  
The United States has the world’s highest per capita emissions of 
black carbon,228 accounting for 8% of the global total.229 In the United 
States, the transport sector is responsible for 52.3% of U.S. black 
carbon emissions;230 35.3% results from biomass burning, including 
wildlife fires, and 7.8% from stationary sources such as energy 
production and other industrial sources.231 
While the United States has made efforts to reduce black carbon 
from the transport sector, it can do much more. The EPA estimates 
black carbon emissions will decline by 86% by 2030 due to regulations 
that apply to emissions standards for new engines, including 
requirements resulting in use of diesel particulate filters (DPFs).232 
While this is impressive, there is no need to wait until 2030 or to limit 
the regulations to new engines.233 Because black carbon dissipates 
quickly and has a GWP 100 to 2000 times that of CO2,234 efforts 
should be made to eliminate black carbon more quickly. For example, 
regenerative filters for diesel vehicles reduce black carbon emissions by 
up to 99%.235 According to one estimate, “retrofitting one million 
semitrailer trucks with DPFs between 2012 and 2030 would provide 
the total equivalent carbon dioxide reduction of 96 million metric 
tons—equivalent to eliminating the annual emissions of 21 million 
cars or 1.8 million diesel semitrailer trucks.”236  
227. Id.  
228.  Zeke Hausfather, Black Carbon and Global Warming: A Promising 
Short-Term Approach?, THE YALE FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE 
MEDIA (July 9, 2009), http://www.yaleclimatemediaforum.org/2009 
/07/black-carbon-and-global-warming/. 
229. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON, supra note 211, at 6. 
230. Id. at 2, fig. A. 
231. Id.  
232. Id. at 8.  
233. For example, the EPA has already begun the SmartWay Transport 
Partnership Program, a retrofit program for in-use mobile diesel engines, 
as part of the National Clean Diesel Campaign. SmartWay Transport 
Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanschoolbus/sw-overview.htm 
(last updated  Oct. 22, 2012).  
234. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 6. 
235. S. Biswas et al., Chemical Speciation of PM Emissions from Heavy-Duty 
Diesel Vehicles Equipped with Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF) and 
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) Retrofits, 43 ATMOS. ENV’T 1917, 
1921–22 (2009). 
236. L. BRUCE HILL, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, THE CARBON DIOXIDE-
EQUIVALENT BENEFITS OF REDUCING BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS FROM 
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The EPA could also take more aggressive action to limit black 
carbon emissions from stationary sources resulting from coal 
combustion (for example, utilities, industrial and commercial boilers, 
and other industrial processes) and stationary diesel engines. Existing 
technologies and strategies exist to abate emissions, including “use of 
cleaner fuels and direct PM2.5 reduction technologies such as fabric 
filters (baghouses), electrostatic precipitators (ESPs), and DPFs.”237 
While biomass burning provides additional challenges, options do 
exist,238 such as banning open field burning of agricultural waste.239 
On the global level, the United States could also do much 
more. The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves is a public-private 
partnership comprising more than 300 public and private partners 
and 35 countries that seeks to “save lives, improve livelihoods, 
empower women, and combat climate change by creating a thriving 
global market for clean and efficient household cooking solutions.”240 
It has set a “goal to foster the adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels 
in 100 million households by 2020.”241 However, U.S. contributions to 
the partnership have been small, just $50 million over the first five 
years.242 Given the significance of black carbon to climate change and 
the health of hundreds of millions of women and children exposed to 
black carbon from biomass cooking, more significant U.S. 
U.S. CLASS 8 TRUCKS USING DIESEL PARTICULATE FILTERS: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 4 (2009). 
237. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON, supra note 211, at 8. 
For more on options for reducing black carbon from trucks, see 
Technologies Diesel Retrofit Devices, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleand 
iesel/technologies/retrofits.htm (last updated Sept. 27, 2012).  
238. See Molina et al., supra note 217, at 20619. Addressing biomass cooking 
will be challenging. Biomass cooking, which emits black carbon as well 
as methane and carbon monoxide, both of which produce ozone and 
thus amplify warming, is used by an estimated three billion people in 
the developing world. Despite China’s rapid economic growth, 
approximately 80% of Chinese households rely on solid fuels like wood 
or dung to meet their energy needs. The benefits of replacing traditional 
biomass cooking with BC-free stoves in specific regions would be 
significant: it could reduce BC-caused warming by 70 to 80% over South 
Asia and by 20 to 40% over East Asia. Id. 
239. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 166. 
240. The Cookstove Story, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN COOKSTOVES, 
http://cleancookstoves.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
241. Id.; see also Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/cleancookstoves/index.htmj(last    
visited Dec. 20, 2012).  
242. The United States Commitment to the Global Alliance for Clean 
Cookstoves: Year One Progress Report, U.S. DEP’T. STATE (Sept. 22 
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/173774.h 
tm. 
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contributions could create a huge, positive impact on the environment 
and human health. 
2. Methane 
Methane is a GHG in its own right with an atmospheric life of 12 
years,243 but it is also a precursor for ozone. Methane has the second 
largest RF of the GHGs after CO2.244 Methane is a potent greenhouse 
gas that has 25 times the global warming potential of CO2 over a 100-
year time frame and 72 times the global warming potential of CO2 
over a 20-year time frame.245 The IPCC has reported that present 
atmospheric concentrations of methane “are unprecedented in at least 
the last 650,000 years,” with concentrations rising from 715 parts per 
billion in 1970 to 1,774 in 2005.246 These increases in methane result 
from agriculture, including rice cultivation and the keeping of 
ruminant livestock, coal mining, oil and gas production and 
distribution, biomass burning, and municipal waste landfills.247 
As with reducing emissions of other short-lived climate forcers, 
reducing emissions of methane will have significant co-benefits for 
human health and air quality. For some methane sources, emission 
control measures for methane also reduce other co-emitted substances 
such as VOCs that contribute to the formation of tropospheric ozone, 
as well as air toxins, such as benzene, carbon tetrachloride, and 
chloroform. 
a. Methane to Markets Partnership 
In 2004, fourteen governments, including the United States, 
launched the Methane to Markets Partnership to advance cost-
effective, near-term methane recovery and the use of methane as a 
clean energy source.248 “The Initiative has focused on methane 
recovery and use opportunities in the agriculture (animal waste 
management), coal mine, landfill, and oil and gas system sectors.”249 
The Partnership, renamed the Global Methane Initiative in 2010, now 
includes thirty eight additional governments, the European 
243. Forster et al., supra note 207, at 212, Table 2.14. 
244. Id. at 141, Table 2.1 
245. Id. at 212, Table 2.14. The United States has recently estimated that 
methane has a GWP 21 times that of CO2 over a 100-year period. EPA, 
INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra note 
96, at ES-3. 
246. Forster et al., supra note 207, at 140, 143. 
247. Id. at 142.  
248. Global Methane Initiative: Initiative, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/global 
methane/initiative.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2012).  
249. Id.  
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Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, as well as NGO participants, that have 
collaborated on more than 300 projects around the world that have 
reduced methane emissions by approximately 40 million MtCO2eq.250 
When fully implemented, these projects are expected to reduce 
emissions by more than 60 million MtCO2eq per year while also 
providing new sources of clean energy, supporting technology transfer, 
stimulating local economic growth, and providing public health and 
environmental benefits.251 Participating governments are also asked to 
develop action plans in order to coordinate methane reduction efforts, 
and developed countries will provide coordinated assistance to 
developing country partners.252 
The United States has been a leading participant in the Methane 
to Markets Partnership, yet its commitment could be greatly 
expanded. The current U.S. financial commitment to the Partnership 
is just “$53 million over a five-year period to facilitate the 
development and implementation of methane projects in both 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition.”253 
Even just the fiscal year FY 2006 contribution of $12.9 million led to 
methane reductions of 9 MMTCO2eq.254 Moreover, the $18.3 million 
contribution from the United States helped to leverage an additional 
$261 million from private and foreign government sources.255 Given 
methane’s high GWP and short atmospheric lifespan, additional U.S. 
financial contributions could result in substantial reductions in 
methane emissions.  
b. Natural Gas  
Methane typically composes nearly 90% of natural gas, a fuel that 
is rapidly replacing coal and other fossil fuels to generate electricity 
and power vehicles.256 However, in the United States in 2009, industry 
lost 2.4%—623 billion cubic feet—of methane during production and 
250. See id.  
251. Global Methane Initiative: Accomplishment Report, EPA, http://www. 
epa.gov/globalmethane/accompreport-10.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 
2012). 
252. Terms of Reference, GLOBAL METHANE INITIATIVE, http://www.global 
methane.org/about/terms.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).  
253. EPA, METHANE TO MARKETS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 
SUPPORT OF THE METHANE TO MARKETS PARTNERSHIP 4 (2007). 
254. Id. at 4, 6. 
255. Id. at 7.  
256. SUSAN HARVEY ET AL., NAT’L RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, LEAKING 
PROFITS: THE U.S. OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY CAN REDUCE POLLUTION, 
CONSERVE RESOURCES, AND MAKE MONEY BY PREVENTING METHANE 
WASTE 3 (2012).  
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distribution.257 This represents about 37% of total U.S. methane 
emissions in 2009.258  
The EPA has introduced a number of voluntary programs, such 
as the Natural Gas STAR program, which encourages companies “to 
adopt cost-effective technologies and practices that improve operation 
efficiency and reduce emissions of methane.”259 Through this program, 
the EPA offers technical documents covering a wide range of 
recommended technologies and practices, including implementation 
costs and anticipated payback periods.260 Despite these resources, it 
appears that industry has not embraced the methane-reducing 
technologies and practices recommended by the EPA.261 
In addition, and as noted above,262 the EPA has, for various 
aspects of oil and natural gas production, revised new source 
performance standards for VOCs and sulfur dioxide, revised standards 
for leak detection and repairs, and established emissions standards for 
previously uncontrolled emissions sources.263 While the new standards 
will significantly reduce methane emissions indirectly, the EPA could 
do more if it regulated methane directly.264 According to the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, the EPA leaves approximately 74% of the 
257. Id. These estimates may significantly undervalue emissions lost due to 
production and distribution of natural gas. See id. at 12 (discussing 
uncertainty in methane emissions estimates due to EPA’s accounting 
methods and EPA’s ongoing efforts to improve its estimates).  
258. Id. at 4. More recent estimates put methane emissions from the oil and 
gas industry at more than 40 percent of the total U.S. methane 
emissions—or roughly 5 percent of total U.S. emissions of all GHGs. 
Proposed NSPS Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,535. 
259. Natural Gas STAR Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/gasstar/ (last 
updated Sept. 27, 2012).  
260. See id. 
261. HARVEY ET AL., supra note 256, at 14. 
262. See supra Section III, No. 19. 
263. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 
Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012). 
264. The failure to do so arguably violates the EPA’s duty under Section 111 
of the Clean Air Act because the EPA has already determined that 
methane and other GHGs are “air pollutants” that “in his judgment . . . 
causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 
U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012). See also Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 
15, 2009). 
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methane emissions from the oil and gas industry unaffected by the 
new rules.265  
In addition, the EPA has the authority to regulate existing 
sources of methane emissions, but it has chosen to omit them from 
the new rule despite substantial emissions from existing sources. 
Under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA is required to 
work with the states to control emissions of pollutants, like methane, 
from existing sources.266 The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 
specifically recommended that the EPA adopt standards for existing 
sources.267 Without mandated emission limits on existing sources, such 
as compressors and pneumatic devices, “these outdated devices will 
continue to spew unchecked pollution for years to come.”268 Moreover, 
“[b]ecause a large amount of the pollution from existing sources can 
be controlled using the same or similar technologies that the EPA is 
proposing for new and modified sources, the EPA could quickly and 
efficiently develop and implement such standards.”269 
3. Tropospheric Ozone  
Tropospheric ozone (O3) is a significant greenhouse gas and 
human health pollutant. Ozone is not emitted directly but is formed 
when methane, nitrogen oxides (NOX—nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2)), VOCs, and carbon monoxide react with sunlight.270 
Large increases in these ozone precursor gases have increased 
tropospheric ozone concentrations globally by roughly 30% from 
preindustrial levels; in the northern hemisphere, ozone concentrations 
have more than doubled.271 The contribution of tropospheric ozone to 
265. Letter from Berks Gas Truth et al., to Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator 
(Nov. 30, 2011), available at  http://www.scribd.com/doc/74404768/En 
vironmentalists-Comments-on-EPA-s-Proposed-Oil-and-Gas-Emission-
Rules. 
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
267. See SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD, SHALE GAS PRODUCTION, 
SECOND NINETY DAY REPORT 4–5 (2011) (noting that the proposed 
rules, which did not change in relevant part in the final rules, “fall short 
of the recommendations made in the Subcommittee’s Ninety-Day Report 
because the rules do not directly control methane emissions and the 
NSPS rules as proposed do not cover existing shale gas sources except 
for fractured or re-fractured existing gas wells.”). 
268. Letter from Berks Gas Truth et al., supra note 265. 
269. Id. 
270. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 7–8. 
271. Royal Society, Ground-level Ozone in the 21st Century: Future Trends, 
Impacts and Policy Implications 1 (Sci. Pol’y Report 15/08, Oct. 2008), 
available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Con 
tent/policy/publications/2008/7925.pdf. 
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global warming, even though its atmospheric lifetime is only 4 to 18 
days, is about 20% of that caused by CO2.272  
Emissions of ozone precursor gases arise from a wide variety of 
natural and anthropogenic sources: “energy generation, transport, 
agriculture, industrial processes, biomass burning and land use 
changes such as deforestation are significant sources of O3 precursor 
gases.”273 Given the nature of these sources, socioeconomic factors 
such as poverty, urbanization, and population growth will influence 
the production of natural and anthropogenic O3 precursor emissions, 
as transport, industrial infrastructure, and energy use continue to 
grow.274  
Breathing ozone causes a range of human health problems, 
including chest pain, coughing, throat irritation, and congestion.275 It 
can worsen bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, as well as reduce 
lung function and inflame the linings of the lungs.276 Repeated 
exposure to ozone may permanently scar lung tissue.277 
Ozone is also toxic to plants. UNEP and the WMO estimate that 
measures to control emissions of methane to reduce tropospheric 
ozone concentrations could avoid the loss of about 25 million tons of 
rice, maize, soybean, and wheat annually.278 The Royal Society put 
this damage from ozone in monetary terms: it estimated that ozone 
caused $14 to $26 billion in 2000 in crop damage, a figure 
“significantly higher than present day losses to crops projected to 
occur as a result of climate change.”279  
D. Technology 
As noted in Section II of this paper, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) has reported that if internationally coordinated action 
is not taken by 2017, then all new infrastructure from 2017 to 2035 
would need to be zero-carbon in order to meet the IEA’s 450 ppm 
scenario.280 The way out of this technologically demanding scenario is 
to retire emitting infrastructure before the end of its economic 
272. Molina et al., supra note 217, at 20619; Royal Society, supra note 281, 
at 1. 
273. Royal Society, supra note 271, at 3. 
274. Id. at 11. 
275. Health Effects, EPA, http://epa.gov/glo/health.html (last updated Nov. 
1, 2012).  
276. Id. 
277. Id.  
278. UNEP & WMO, supra note 202, at 16. 
279. Royal Society, supra note 271, at 77. 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 21–25.  
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lifetime. At least in the United States, given the EPA’s focus on 
setting emissions for new and modified sources of GHGs, it seems 
unlikely that firms will be willing to retire that infrastructure early. 
The costs of this inaction are steep—for every $1 of avoided 
investment in the power sector before 2020, an additional $4.3 after 
2020 must be spent to compensate for the higher emissions.281 Also as 
described earlier, we need a technological revolution. Hybrid engines 
still run on fossil fuel; they are part of an incremental approach that 
ultimately continues our dependence on fossil fuels. Even the new 
emissions standards set for 2017 to 2025 will not require a 
technological revolution away from fossil fuels, despite requiring an 
average fuel economy of 54.5 mpg.282 
So how do we achieve this technological revolution? Here are 
some ideas, none of which are totally new: climate change technology 
prizes, serious investments in renewable energy infrastructure, and 
elimination of fossil fuel subsidies. 
1. Climate Change Technology Prizes 
The idea of offering prizes for technological and other 
breakthroughs is not new.283 After years of failing to find a means to 
navigate the oceans safely without getting lost, the British Parliament 
offered a prize to the person who could design such a system.284 
Taking up the challenge, John Harrison, a self-educated English 
carpenter and clockmaker, invented the marine chronometer to 
establish the longitude of a ship at sea. For his efforts, the British 
Parliament awarded him £8,750285 in addition to £10,000 in prize 
money from Britain’s Board of Longitude.286 
Professor Jonathan Adler has recently summarized the benefits of 
prizes over grants.287 Grants tend to limit the range of promising 
281. IEA, supra note 21, at 2. 
282. See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets High Long-Term Fuel Efficiency Rules for 
Automakers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at B1 (quoting Daniel Becker, 
Director of the Safe Climate Campaign, a Washington-based 
environmental advocacy group, as saying “[t]he vast majority of vehicles 
will be more efficient without using electric or hybrid powertrains”). 
283. See, e.g., DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RES. SERV., R40677, FEDERALLY 
FUNDED INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES 1 (2009). 
284. See generally DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE 
GENIUS WHO SOLVED THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME 
(1995). 
285. Id. at 149. 
286. Id. at 129–32. 
287. See Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy 
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
28–35 (2011). 
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ventures because grant recipients must meet specific grant criteria. In 
addition, the research resulting from a grant may not result in useful 
technological innovations, but the government must pay for the 
research regardless of its value or marketability. Moreover, political 
pressure may influence grant decision-making.288 In contrast, prizes 
are only paid when the innovation meets specified criteria. Further, 
prizes may incentivize innovation more than regulatory or market-
based mechanisms.289 As the National Academies of Science (NAS) 
noted, “compared with grant programs, prize programs may be 
expected to attract more individuals, informal teams, and for-profit 
firms of various sizes and perhaps not as many academic 
institutions.”290 
The major questions with climate change prizes are the dollar 
amount of the prizes, the criteria for receiving the prizes, and 
ownership of the intellectual property rights. While some have 
suggested prize values of $100 to $200 million annually for 
innovations in zero-energy building design, reductions in urban 
greenhouse gas emissions, and increased development of fuel-efficient 
vehicles,291 others have suggested much higher dollar amounts, 
perhaps as much as $1 billion per year over ten years, representing 
one third of the $30 billion the federal government has budgeted for 
climate-related technologies over the next decade.292 For the kinds of 
transformative technologies we need to transform energy systems, the 
transport sector, and industrial processes, prizes towards the higher 
dollar suggestion may be more appropriate.293 
With respect to intellectual property rights, the NAS counsels 
that the federal government should not retain ownership of the 
intellectual property deriving from the invention unless the 
prizewinner chooses not to put the invention into commercial use or 
allow others to license the invention.294 It also proposes that the 
prizewinner not be required to make the invention available at no cost 
or on concessional terms.295 These stipulations certainly would help 
288. Id. at 44. 
289. Id. at 36. 
290. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., INNOVATION INDUCEMENT 
PRIZES AT THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 13 (2007). 
291. Thomas Kalil, Prizes for Technological Innovation, 9 (The Brookings 
Inst. & The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2006-08, Dec. 2006). 
292. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize, supra note 287, at 43. 
293. In this regard, the £20,000 offered in 1714 for designing a system to 
measure longitude would be worth roughly £3 million today ($4.74 
million). 
294. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 290, at 33–34. 
295. Id. at 33. 
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encourage inventors to test novel technologies. The one caveat that 
might be made is that the federal government be allowed to recoup 
some portion of the prize money, particularly if the prize money tends 
toward the $1 billion range. 
2. Investments in Renewable Energy Infrastructure 
The IEA anticipates that energy consumption will grow by 53% 
from 2008 to 2035 without policies that bend this trajectory.296 In the 
absence of such policies, the share of fossil fuels in global primary 
energy consumption will be around 75% in 2035.297 Moving towards 
energy sustainability will require policies on a broad range of fronts, 
including conserving energy, increasing energy efficiency, fuel 
switching, and improving land use practices to improve carbon 
storage and prevent CO2 emissions. As the United Nations 
Environment Programme succinctly states, “[n]one of these things will 
happen without any effort. Governments individually and collectively 
will need to make them happen through strong policies and measures, 
including a range of regulatory and market-based interventions.”298 
Just as with fossil fuel subsidies, accounting for the precise value 
of subsidies for renewable energy is difficult, largely because subsidies 
come in a variety of forms, and assessors must determine whether 
some governmental programs meet their definition of a subsidy.299 In 
296. International Energy Outlook 2011: Highlights, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/. 
297. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 2011, at 2 (2011). 
298. UN ENVIR. PROG., REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES: OPPORTUNITIES TO 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA 10 (2008) [hereinafter 
UNEP REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES]. 
299. UNEP synthesizes the various definitions of “subsidy” as follows: 
There is enormous confusion about what is meant by an energy 
subsidy. The narrowest and perhaps most common definition is 
a direct cash payment by a government to an energy producer 
or consumer to stimulate production or use of a particular fuel 
or form of energy. Broader definitions attempt to capture other 
types of government interventions that affect prices or costs, 
either directly or indirectly. For example, a recent [Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development] study defined a 
subsidy in general terms as any measure that keeps prices for 
consumers below market levels, or for producers above market 
levels or that reduces costs for consumers and producers. The 
US Energy Information Administration has defined an energy 
subsidy as any government action designed to influence energy 
market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, 
regulation, research and development or public enterprises. In a 
similar way, the IEA defines energy subsidies as any government 
action that concerns primarily the energy sector that lowers the 
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any event, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that 2010 
subsidies for renewable energy exceeded $14.67 billion in 2010,300 $6.19 
billion deriving from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009.301 
As another means to encourage technological change, the 
president should champion a national feed-in tariff program. Feed-in 
tariff programs for solar and wind power have proven effective in 
Denmark, German, Japan, and elsewhere.302 They have also been 
effective in parts of the United States, such as Portland and Eugene, 
Oregon.303 A national feed-in tariff program could provide the 
incentive for a renewable energy breakthrough.304  
Additional subsidies for the renewable energy sector may also 
spur the innovation and transition to a low-carbon economy. 
Identifying an end date or specific target at which time the subsidies 
end may help signal to producers and consumers that these subsidies 
are not everlasting. In the case of climate change, perhaps the end 
date is when the technology is cost-competitive with fossil fuel power 
or when renewables reach a specific percentage of energy 
consumption. 
3. Eliminate Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Even as CO2, a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, warms the 
planet, the world’s nations are subsidizing the consumption of fossil 
fuels by more than $312 billion annually305 and the production of fossil 
cost of energy production, raises the price received by energy 
producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers.  
 Id. at 11.  
300. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DIRECT FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS 
AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010, at xiii, Table ES2 
(2011). 
301. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–5, 
123 Stat. 115, 138–40, § 24. 
302. UNEP REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES, supra note 298, at 25. 
303. See Lee van der Voo, New Rates Set for Oregon’s Feed-in-Tariff 
Program, SUSTAINABLE BUS. OREGON (Sept. 21, 2010), http:// 
www.sustainablebusinessoregon.com/articles/2010/09/new_rates_set_f
or_oregons_feed-in_tariff_program.html?page=all (demonstrating that 
the feed-in-tariff program was “so popular with consumers that its 
capacity was subscribed in just 15 minutes in the first enrollment period 
July 1.”).  
304. In 2008, Congressman Jay Inslee introduced a national feed-in tariff bill 
into the 110th Congress known as the Renewable Energy Jobs and 
Security Act, H.R.6401. For a discussion of some of the legal and policy 
issues relating to this bill, see WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., FEED-IN 
TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE USA: A POLICY UPDATE 11–16 
(2008). 
305. INT’L  ENERGY AGENCY, supra not 297, at 3. 
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fuels by perhaps another $100 billion.306 Clearly these subsidies distort 
markets around the world, ensuring that petroleum products enter the 
market far below production costs and inhibit the development of 
renewable energy supplies. Moreover, they increase emissions of CO2. 
Elimination of fossil fuel subsidies could reduce CO2 emissions from 
1.1% to 18%.307 The $400 to $500 billion a year in fossil fuel subsidies 
is roughly 1% of world gross domestic product (GDP); this is the 
amount that the Stern Review estimated was required to limit global 
warming to no more than a 2°C rise in temperature.308 
Given the complexity of the way subsidies are provided, an exact 
figure of annual U.S. fossil fuel subsidies is difficult to identify, but 
U.S. fossil fuel subsidies appear to be in the range of $10 billion309 to 
$52 billion310 annually. Three times, President Obama has submitted a 
budget to Congress that modestly reduces fossil fuel production 
subsidies—about $4 billion annually311—only to have Congress restore 
them in the approved budget.312 The President spoke at Nashua 
Community College in New Hampshire in March 2012 on the need to 
306. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF ENERGY 
SUBSIDIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE G–20 INITIATIVE 4 (2010). Producer 
subsidies are estimated to be at least $100 billion, and consumer 
subsidies to be estimated to be between $200 and $600 billion. See 
GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE (GSI) OF THE INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., GSI-UNEP CONFERENCE REPORT, INCREASING THE 
MOMENTUM OF FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDY REFORM: DEVELOPMENT AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 14–15 (2010). 
307. JENNIFER ELLIS, GLOBAL STUD. INITIATIVE, THE UNTOLD BILLIONS: 
FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES, THEIR IMPACTS AND THE PATH TO FREEDOM 29 
(2010) 
308. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN 
REVIEW 12–14 (2006).  
309. ENVTL. LAW INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO ENERGY 
SOURCES: 2002–2008, at 3 (2009) (concluding that fossil fuel subsidies 
totaled approximately $72 billion over the seven-year study period). 
310. Clayton, supra note 166. 
311. Fossil Fuel Subsidies in the U.S., OIL CHANGE INT’L, http://priceof 
oil.org/fossil-fuel-subsidies/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
312. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2010: TERMINATIONS, 
REDUCTIONS, AND SAVINGS 7, 69 (2009) [hereinafter 2010 TRS]; OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011: TERMINATIONS, REDUCTIONS, AND 
SAVINGS 7 (2010) [hereinafter 2011 TRS]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
FISCAL YEAR 2012: TERMINATIONS, REDUCTIONS, AND SAVINGS 81 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2012 TRS]. 
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eliminate fossil fuel subsidies. 313 That is a start. Perhaps his next 
speech on the subject will be somewhere more visible than a small 
community college in New Hampshire. The fossil fuel industry is 
clearly a mature industry, comprising some of the world’s most 
profitable corporations; the five biggest oil companies—BP, Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Shell—made $137 billion in 2011 
alone.314 This is hardly an industry that needs public support.315 The 
savings from these subsidies could be diverted either to climate 
change technology prizes, subsidies for renewable energy, or the cost 
of building infrastructure to move renewable energy from production 
areas to the existing grid. 
Ending these subsidies will require congressional action. Yet, the 
president can use his bully pulpit to educate citizens about the cost of 
these subsidies and identify of those who receive them. The harsh 
spotlight of highly profitable companies receiving the nation’s largesse 
at a time of economic constraint could compel legislators to eliminate 
such subsidies. This is optimistic, perhaps, based on the knowledge 
that earlier efforts have failed to eliminate subsidies to BP, Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Shell.316 
V. Conclusion 
For the first time since the United States became one of the first 
ratifiers of the UNFCCC in 1992, the United States has a climate 
change policy focused on reducing CO2 and other GHGs. Most of this 
policy has been generated by the Obama Administration through 
executive action, primarily within the EPA but also within other 
agencies.317 Unfortunately, this is not enough. To put the United 
States on a path closer to meeting its pledge to reduce GHG emissions 
by 17% by 2020 and 83% by 2050, President Obama or any 
313. Responding to Climate Change Staff, Obama Calls on Congress to End 
Fossil-Fuel Subsides (Mar. 2, 2012) http://www.rtcc.org/energy/obama-
calls-on-congress-to-end-fossil-fuel-subsides/ (reporting that President 
Obama said, “Right now, $4 billion of your tax dollars—$4 billion—
subsidise [sic] the oil industry every year.”). 
314. See Karen Showalter, Senate Fails to Cut Favors to Big Oil, Once 
Again, OIL CHANGE INT’L (Mar. 29, 2012), http://priceofoil.org/20 
12/03/29/senate-fails-to-cut-favors-to-big-oil-once-again/. 
315. Moreover, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies would reduce externalized 
costs of pollution and health care costs. The U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences reported that fossil fuel use costs the United States $120 billion 
in pollution and related health care costs in 2005. See NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 21 (2010). 
316. See Fossil Fuel Subsidies in the U.S., supra note 311. 
317. See supra Section III. 
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subsequent president must do more. In the short term, it is clear that 
the action must come from the executive branch as Congress has 
shown no signs of addressing climate change. As described in Section 
IV, there is much more the president can do with his treaty-making 
authority and other powers granted to the executive. Many of these 
actions can bring significant climate benefits with known technologies, 
such as eliminating 99% of black carbon emissions on existing trucks 
by requiring the use of filters. Directly regulating methane from 
existing and new oil and gas production and transmission operations 
would reduce emissions of methane, a GHG much more potent that 
CO2. 
On September 16, 2012, we learned that Arctic sea ice once again 
hit an all-time low for ice cover.318 The six lowest ice extents in the 
satellite record have now occurred in the last six years (2007 to 
2012).319 New research shows that Greenland and Antarctica are 
losing three times as much ice as twenty years ago and contributing 
significantly to sea level rise.320 In this political climate, President 
Obama must use the presidency to act. When Lyndon Johnson was 
counseled not to try and resuscitate a civil rights bill that seemed as 
doomed as many previous civil rights bills, he famously responded, 
“Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?”321 This is the question that 
President Obama must ask. He staked his first term on achieving 
something many other presidents, including Lyndon Johnson, had 
failed to do: adopting national health legislation. He must stake his 
second term on passage of meaningful climate change legislation. 
With the Senate unwilling to lead, the president must grab the 
leadership reins and move the United States as close as it can to 
achieving its pledges. We can’t wait. 
318. Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L 
SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arctic 
seaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-
minimum/ (“On September 16, Arctic sea ice appeared to have reached 
its minimum extent for the year of 3.41 million square kilometers (1.32 
million square miles). This is the lowest seasonal minimum extent in the 
satellite record since 1979 and reinforces the long-term downward trend 
in Arctic ice extent.”). 
319. Id. 
320. See Andrew Shepherd et al., A Reconciled Estimate of Ice-Sheet Mass 
Balance, SCIENCE, Nov. 2012, at 1183–89. 
321. ROBERT CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER 487 (2012). 
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